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INTRODUCTION

O Namended
May 7, 1992, the American people discovered that they had
the Constitution almost in a fit of absent-mindedness. On
that date, Michigan became the thirty-eighth state to ratify an amendment proposed in the First Congress on June 8, 1789 by Representative
James Madison. The amendment, which had been all but neglected for
two centuries, provides as follows:
No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators
and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.1
Thirteen days later, on May 20, 1992, the relevant authorities-the Archivist of the United States, the House of Representatives, the Senate,
and the academic community-concurred that the amendment had been
validly adopted.2
No one in the Revolutionary generation of Americans would have predicted the protracted birth pangs of the amendment proposed so indifferently in 1789. Ironically, however, the issues that its adoption revived in
the 1990s were familiar to the ablest and most sophisticated constitutional theorists of the 1780s. For example, during the Federal Convention of 1787, James Madison tried to draw the attention of his colleagues
to the uncertainties that surrounded the amending process set forth in
Article V of the Constitution. On September 15, 1787, Madison pleaded
unsuccessfully that the Convention define with more specificity and clarity the workings of that process, stating, "difficulties might arise as to the
form, the quorum, &c. which in Constitutional regulations ought to be as
much as possible avoided." 3 The triumph of the Twenty-seventh
Amendment has exposed to public view some of the "difficulties ...in
Constitutional regulations" that Madison had vainly sought to address.'
This Article seeks to clarify the Amendment's tangled history and
sketch its legacy.5 Part I elucidates the antecedents of the Amendment
in the confluence of two historical phenomena-the Anglo-American
concern over the role of legislatures in governance and the demand by
1. U.S. Const. amend. XXVII.
2. See infra part IV.
3. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 630 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937) [hereinafter Records] (all references are to James Madison's notes unless otherwise
indicated).
4. Id.
5. This Article draws on, corrects, and supplements the two previous extended discussions of the Amendment. See David C. Huckabee, Congressional Research Serv. No.
86-889 GOV, The Constitutional Amendment to Regulate Congressional Salary Increases: A Slumbering Proposal's New Popularity, (Sept. 16, 1986) [hereinafter Slumbering Proposal]; Robert S. Miller & Donald 0. Dewey, The Congressional Salary
Amendment: 200 Years Later, 10 Glendale L. Rev. 92-109 (1991). I also make extensive
use of Congressional Research Serv. No. LRS92-3691, The Twenty-seventh Amendment:
Congressional Pay and the Constitution-Background Material and Selected News Articles, 1987-1992 (June 1992) [hereinafter Background Material].

1992]

THE TWENTY-SEVENTH AMENDMENT

many Americans during the period from 1787 to 1791 for amendments
to the Constitution of 1787. Part II describes the Amendment's framing
in 1789 by the First Federal Congress. Part III addresses its apparent
failure by 1791 and its long term of suspended animation. Part IV describes the resurrection of the Amendment by a modest, grass-roots campaign that all but escaped the attention of most scholarly and
professional commentators on the Constitution. It also examines the
confused and fumbling reaction of scholars and politicians alike to the
adoption of the Amendment in May 1992. Part V seeks to explain the
effects of the Amendment's adoption on the unresolved issues of the
amending process. The Conclusion examines why the Twenty-seventh
Amendment succeeded in a period when every other attempt but one to
amend the Constitution failed, and what implications its ratification has
for practitioners of "amendment politics."

I.

ANTECEDENTS

The document that most Americans picture when they think of the
Bill of Rights is an engrossed parchment resolution codifying the amendments proposed by Congress on September 26, 1789. In the decades
before May 1992, when Americans visited the National Archives to see
the "record copy" of the Bill of Rights, they did not recognize that it
contained a constitutional time-bomb. Even those who noticed that the
original Bill of Rights lists twelve amendments (rather than the familiar
ten) skipped over the first two as historical curiosities.
The compensation amendment 6 is more than a curiosity. It represents
the intersection of two important historical phenomena: first, the ongoing struggle in the eighteenth-century Anglo-American world to craft a
representative legislature and, second, the battle over ratification of the
Constitution, which dominated American politics in 1787-1788 and cast
a threatening shadow over the launching of the new government in 1789.
To understand its origins, therefore, we must reexamine each of these
phenomena in turn.
A.

Legislative Design and Legislative Compensation: The AngloAmerican Experience

In designing Congress, the delegates to the Federal Convention drew
upon the Anglo-American experience with legislatures in Great Britain,
in the American colonies and states, and at the national level (the Continental and Confederation Congresses). 7 Questions of legislative compensation were an important secondary consideration in the task of
6. For purposes of clarity, and to avoid teleology, this Article refers to the Amendment as the compensation amendment in the period before its adoption, and as the
Twenty-seventh Amendment in the period after its adoption.
7. This section draws on Richard B. Bernstein, 'Conven'd in Firm Debate': The
First Congress as an Institution of Government, 1789-1791 (forthcoming 1993).
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legislative design, following such primary considerations as methods of
representation and grants of legislative power.

The Americans' principal model for a national legislative institution
was the British Parliament. From Parliament, Americans derived their
ideas of legislative practice and procedure and their ideas about how legislatures should respond to national problems and issues.8 Even after

Congress was set in motion under the Constitution, notable American
politicians often had recourse to Parliamentary models and precedents.
For example, in 1805, when Vice President Aaron Burr prepared for the
Senate's impeachment trial of Justice Samuel Chase, he adopted arrangements for the Senate chamber echoing those used in the House of Lords
during the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings.9 Thus, Americans of
the Revolutionary era were familiar with Parliamentary customs and usages, including such questions as what (if any) compensation members of
the House of Commons were to receive.
Until the sixteenth century, members' wages were paid by their constituents; 10 until 1710, there was no property qualification for members
of the House of Commons; 1 and until 1712 there was no provision for
imposing election expenses (previously almost negligible) on candidates. 1 2 Beginning in the seventeenth century, however, the House of
Commons gradually erected barriers that had the effect of excluding men
without means from Parliament. 3 The leading student of the House of
Commons before the Great Reform Bill of 183214 has shown how some
candidates at first bid for their constituents' approval and support by
promising to take lower wages, and later raised the stakes by pledging
8. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson's Parliamentary Writings, reprintedin The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, second series (Wilbur S. Howell ed., 2d ed. 1988); Ralph V.
Harlow, The History of Legislative Methods in the Period Before 1825 (1917); 1 Edward
Porritt with Annie G. Porritt, The Unreformed House of Commons: Parliamentary Representation Before 1832, at vi (1909).
9. See Richard E. Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young
Republic 96 (1971). For further discussions of the Chase impeachment, see id. at 81-82,
90, 92-93, 96-107; Eleanore Bushnell, Crimes, Follies, and Misfortunes: The Federal Impeachment Trials 57-88 (1992); 2 Robert C. Byrd, The Senate 1789-1989: Addresses on
the History of the United States Senate 59-92 (1991); William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests 15-134 (1992). On the Hastings precedent, see generally The Impeachment of
Warren Hastings: Papers from a Bicentenary Commemoration (Geoffrey Carnall &
Colin Nicholson eds., 1989).
10. See I Porritt, supra note 8, at 153-54.
11. See id. at 166-67 (citing 9 Anne, c. 5 (1710) (statute imposing property requirement)). An excerpted version is given in The Eighteenth-Century Constitution: 16881815, at 192-93 (E. Neville Williams ed., 1960) [hereinafter The Eighteenth Century
Constitution].
12. See I Porritt, supra note 8, at 152-53, 182-203 (citing 10 Anne, c. 31 (1712) (statute placing the burden of election expenses on the candidates)).
13. See 1 id. at 151-203.
14. 2 W. IV. c. 25 (1832). The leading study is John Cannon, Parliamentary Reform,
1640-1832 (1973); see also The Eighteenth-Century Constitution, supra note 11, at 20821; Paul Langford, A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727-1783, at 548, 552-53,
563-64, 710-19 (1989).
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not to accept wages altogether.15 The demand for seats in the House of
Commons became so fierce during the eighteenth century that would-be
members even found themselves assuming the cost for municipal improvements, such as new public buildings or repaved streets, in an effort
to win the support of their constituents. 6 Such largesse continued even
after the adoption of the two great reform measures of 1832 and 1867." 7
Americans in the 1770s and 1780s, fascinated by the apparent and real
corruption of the British constitution, were aware that members of the
House of Commons often played these artful political games to win and
secure their seats-including, ultimately, the purchase and sale of constituents' votes. To the Americans, the ostentatious purchase of Parliamentary seats (including such unpopulated "rotten boroughs" as Old
Sarum)"8 and the often blatant vote-buying attending elections, even in
legitimate boroughs containing living-and-breathing constituents, exemplified the extraordinary corruption that tainted the British constitutional system. This corruption, they believed, led members of Parliament
to override the Americans' rights under the British constitution.' 9
Guarding against such real or perceived corruption, colonial and state
governments early on assumed the responsibility of paying the salaries of
their members.20 At the same time, however, the adoption of property
qualifications helped to exclude from the legislature most of those who
would rely on the salaries they might expect to receive as members. 2'
In 1774, when the colonists convened the First Continental Congress,
the colonial legislatures assumed the burden of paying their delegations.
This practice persisted once, in 1776, the Second Continental Congress
ceased to be an extraordinary body and began to assume the character
and functions of an American legislature; and it continued after the
framing (in 1777) and adoption (in 1781) of the Articles of
15. See I Porritt, supra note 8, at 155, 157, 158. For illustrative documents, see The
Eighteenth-Century Constitution, supra note 11, at 154-73.
16. See 1 Porritt, supra note 8, at 158-66. See generally The Eighteenth-Century Constitution, supra note 11, at 138-208 (collected documents depicting patterns of electoral
behavior and customs).
17. See 1 Porritt, supra note 8, at 164-65.
18. See 1 id. at 96-98; The Eighteenth-Century Constitution, supra note 11, at 151-52
(agreement for purchase of Old Sarum by Prince of Wales, 1749).
19. See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 46-51,
85-93, 130-138 (enlarged ed. 1992).
20. See ag, Mass. Const., Part Second: Frame of Gov't, ch.1, § 3, art. 2, cl.4 (1780)
(payment of expenses of members of house of representatives). On colonial governance in
general, see Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics (1968); Jackson Turner
Main, The Sovereign States 1775-1783, at 102-06 (1973); Allan Nevins, The American
States During and After the Revolution, 1775-1789, at 1-14 (1924); R.C. Simmons, The
American Colonies from Settlement to Independence (1976).
21. See Donald S. Lutz, Popular Consent and Popular Control: Whig Political Theory in the Early State Constitutions 90 (1980) (table of property qualifications for holding
office). On the growing ineffectiveness of these requirements, see Main, supra note 20, at
200-06.
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Confederation.22
Two distinct but related developments, however, interfered with the
states' self-assumed responsibility for footing the bills of their delegations. First, state legislatures continued the practice, honored by tradition, of using their control on the pursestrings to punish Congress for
ignoring their state's interests, and this fiscal war of nerves extended to
the pay of state delegations.23 Second, as the nation's economy worsened
during and after the American Revolution, expenses closer to home assumed a greater importance for tight-fisted state legislators than expenses
of a far-off and less relevant Confederation. In either case, the effect was
the same: delegates to the Continental and Confederation Congresses
had to wait longer and longer to be paid-if they were paid at all. Even
those delegates who had independent means, and thus did not rely on the
small salaries paid by the states, did not accept this situation lightly. Notable American politicians began to write scathing letters to their home
how long they were to serve their country
states, demanding to know
24
without being paid for it.
B. Framingthe Compensation Clause
The compensation amendment was intended to amend Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, which provides as
follows:
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for
their Services, to be ascertained
by Law, and paid out of the Treasury
25
of the United States.
It is therefore appropriate at this point to examine the origins and development of this clause in the Federal Convention.
One of the Convention's subsidiary purposes in designing the first true
national legislature was to ensure that the national government would be
able to pay its officials to safeguard its independence and stability. The
means to this objective first appeared in the Virginia Plan, drafted by
James Madison (and revised by his colleagues in the Virginia delegation)
and submitted to the Convention on May 29, 1787, by Governor Edmund Randolph.26 The fourth and fifth resolutions provided that the
members of both chambers of the national legislature "receive liberal sti22. See Articles of Confederation, art. V,para. 3 (1781): "Each state shall maintain
its own delegates in a meeting of the states, and while they act as members of the committee of the states."
23. For the history of these contests in the colonies, see Jack P. Greene, The Quest for
Power (1963). For examples and discussions of these struggles in the Continental and
Confederation Congresses, see Edmund Cody Burnett, The Continental Congress 420,
421, 425, 629, 650, 710, 713 (1941); Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union, 178 11789, at 91-94 (1987); Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress 235-38 (1979).
24. See sources cited supra note 23.
25. U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl.1.
26. See 1 Records, supra note 3, at 20-22.

1992]

THE TWENTY-SEVENTH AMENDMENT

pends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time
to public service." 27 Massachusetts delegate Elbridge Gerry indirectly
commented on the salary question on May 31. In arguing that "[t]he
evils we experience flow from the excesses of democracy," 28 he noted as
"one principal evil" of democracy "the want of due provision for those
employed in the administration of Governnt [sic]. It would seem to be a
maxim of democracy to starve the public servants." 29
The delegates first discussed this clause of the Virginia Plan on June
12, when the Convention was meeting as a committee of the whole
house-a useful parliamentary device permitting freer, more wide-ranging discussion than formal debate. Madison proposed amending the
clause by adding the words "& flxt" (that is, fixed). 3° He observed: "[I]t
would be improper to leave the members of the Natl. legislature to be
provided for by the State Legisls: because it would create an improper
dependence; and to leave them to regulate their own wages, was an indecent thing, and might in time prove a dangerous one."' 31 To avoid the
admixture of politics with the process of setting legislative salaries,
Madison proposed that the Constitution incorporate a reliable and easily
ascertainable economic benchmark, such as the price of wheat. 32 A colleague from Virginia, George Mason, seconded Madison's motion, and
suggested two reasons why it would be unwise to permit states to regulate their members' wages. First, the various pay scales among the states
would tend to create an atmosphere of inequality in chambers where
members were equal in all other respects. Second, because "the parsimony of the States might reduce the provision so low as had already
happened in choosing delegates to Congress, the question would be not
'33
who were most fit to be chosen, but who were most willing to serve. 1
Madison's amendment was adopted, eight states to three,3 as was a motion by William Pierce of Georgia "that the wages should be paid out of
27. 1 id. at 20. Only one delegate firmly rejected the idea of any salaries for federal
office, and then only for executive posts. On June 2, 1787, Benjamin Franklin suggested
that no member of the executive branch of the new national government be paid a salary.
He posited that the Convention should not create lucrative posts that would attract unworthy men seeking to earn a salary rather than serving their country. His colleagues at
the Convention treated the proposal gently, with great respect for its author, but shelved
it without comment. See Benjamin Franklin, speech of June 2, 1787, reprinted in 1
Records, supra note 3, at 81-85; William G. Carr, The Oldest Delegate: Franklin in the
Constitutional Convention 90-91, 151-54 (1990).
28. 1 Records, supra note 3, at 48.
29. Id
30. See I id at 215.
31. 1 id at 215-16.
32. See I id at 216.
33. Id
34. The vote was as follows: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia in favor, with Massachusetts, Connecticut,
and South Carolina opposed. See id New Hampshire's delegation had not yet arrived,
and Rhode Island had refused to send delegates.
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35
the National Treasury.
Ten days later, on June 22, the full Convention revisited the resolution,
and issues that seemingly had been settled exploded. Oliver Ellsworth of
Connecticut moved that the national legislators be paid by the states
rather than out of the national treasury. Ellsworth observed:

[T]he manners of different States were very different in the Stile [sic) of
living and in the profits accruing from the exercise of like talents.
What would be deemed therefore a reasonable compensation in some
States, in others would be very unpopular, and might impede the system of which it made a part.36
Hugh Williamson of North Carolina agreed, noting that the new states
"to the Westward" would be so poor, and so unable to make adequate
contributions to the national treasury, that they would have different interests from the older states. It would not be fair, he concluded, to ask
who would
the older states to shoulder the burden of compensating3 "men
7
be employed in thwarting their measures & interests.,
Both Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts and Edmund Randolph of
Virginia countered by urging that the question of salaries not be determined by "consulting popular prejudices.1 3s Gorham made a twopronged argument. First, he maintained that state legislatures "were always paring down salaries in such a manner as to keep out of offices men
most capable of executing the functions of them."'39 Second, he pointed
out that because the state legislatures exercised the same power of setting
their own salaries without significant abuse, the national legislature
would not abuse this power in its own interest. Randolph then stressed
that "[i]f the States were to pay the members of the Natl. Legislature, a
dependence would be created that would vitiate the whole System." 4
Randolph concluded that "[tlhe whole nation has an interest in the attendance & services of the members. The Nationl. Treasury therefore is
the proper fund for supporting them."4 1
Rufus King of Massachusetts echoed Randolph's point, suggesting
that it actually might defuse controversy to set an exact "quantum."4 2
Roger Sherman of Connecticut insisted that both the level of and the
responsibility for paying salary should remain with the state legislatures.4 3 James Wilson of Pennsylvania opposed fixing the level of com35. Id. Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, and Georgia supported Pierce's motion, and Connecticut, New York,
and South Carolina opposed it. Nothing in the surviving documentation explains the
switches by Massachusetts and New York from their positions in the previous vote.
36. 1 id. at 371-72.
37. 1 id. at 372.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See 1 id. at 373.
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pensation for "circumstances would change and call for a change of the
amount."' He emphasized the necessity of rendering the national government "as independent (as possible) of the State Govts. in all
respects." 4
Madison agreed with Wilson on the general question of independence
but returned to his proposal for fixing the degree of compensation.
Madison rejected the arguments of Ellsworth and Williamson for stateby-state or regional variation in compensation, citing the plight of the
future western states:
He disliked particularly the policy suggested by Mr. Wiliamson [sic] of
leaving the members from the poor States beyond the Mountains, to
the precarious & parsimonious support of their constituents. If the
Western States hereafter arising should be admitted into the Union,
they ought to be considered as equals & as brethren. If their representatives were to be associated in the Common Councils, it was of common concern that such provisions should be made as would invite the
most capable and respectable characters into the service.4 6
Alexander Hamilton of New York demurred from Madison's proposal
that the wages be fixed in the body of the Constitution, and suggested
that it would produce "inconveniency." 4 7 Hamilton reserved his greatest
scorn, however, for the proposal that the states pay the national legislators. He stated, "Those who pay are the masters of those who are
paid.... [There is a] difference between the feelings & views of thepeople
& the Governments of the States arising from the personal interest & official inducements which must render the latter unfriendly to the Genl.
48

Govt."

At this point, James Wilson moved that the salaries of the first branch
"be ascertainedby the NationalLegislature, and be paid out of the Natl.
Treasury." 9 Madison reasserted his worry that allowing members to set
their own salary would present a conflict of interest. He stated that "[i]t
wd. be indecent to put their hands into the public purse for the sake of
their own pockets." 0 Wilson's motion failed, seven states to two, with
two divided."1 Ellsworth then moved, once again, to strike out the reference to the "Natl. Treasury." Hamilton insisted that "[t]he State legislatures ought not.., to be the paymasters" of the national legislature, but
Ellsworth retorted: "If we are jealous of the State Govts. they will be so
of us. If on going home I tell them we gave the Gen. Govt. such powers
44. Id
45. Id
46. Id
47. Id
48. Id
49. Id
50. 1 id at 374.
51. New Jersey and Pennsylvania favored the motion; Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina opposed it; and New
York and Georgia were divided. See id
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because we cd. not trust you.-will they adopt it. & with[ou]t yr. approbation it is a nullity." 5 2 Ellsworth's motion also failed, by a vote of four
states to five with two divided.5"
The Convention then managed a rare instance of unanimity, agreeing
to substitute the phrase "adequate compensation" for "fixt stipends"but, as Madison noted, the proponents of the latter phrase agreed5 to
dis4
cuss the practicability of fixing the compensation at a later time.
Pierce Butler of South Carolina then moved to adopt the entire
amended clause ("adequate compensation to be paid out of the Nati.
Treasury").55 Butler's motion was opposed as being out of order since
the Convention had considered each of its two parts separately. 56 President Washington, however, referred the question of order to the Conven57
tion, which supported Butler's motion by a vote of six states to four;
but then South Carolina invoked its right to postpone the entire clause.5 8
Consequently, on June 23, the Convention revisited the clause and defeated it, five states to five, with one divided. 9
The issue then was sidetracked, as the Convention pitched into its last
great contest over the modes of representation in the national legislature.
The compensation clause did not resurface until after the Committee of
Detail (appointed on July 26 to prepare a first draft of the Constitution)
delivered its report on August 6. Article VI, section 10 of that draft read
as follows:
The members of each House shall receive a compensation for their
services,6 to be ascertained and paid by the State, in which they shall be
chosen.

0

From August 6 through September 10, the delegates carried out another
cycle of informal and formal review, clause by clause. They revisited the
compensation provision on August 14, when Oliver Ellsworth announced that he had changed his mind and now opposed having the
52. Id.

53. Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carolina favored it; New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia opposed it; and New York and
Georgia divided. See id. In a marginal note, Madison observed: "It appeared that
Massts. concurred, not because they thought the State Treasy. ought to be substituted;
but because they thought nothing should be said on the subject, in which case it wd.
silently devolve on the Natl. Treasury to support the National Legislature." Id.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. See id.

57. Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina voted that the motion was in order; New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Georgia
voted that it was not; and Massachusetts divided. See I id. at 374-75.
58. See IId. at 375.
59. Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia favored it;
Connecticut, New York, Delaware, North Carolina, and South Carolina opposed it; and
Georgia divided. See 1 id. at 385.
60. 2 id.at 180.
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states pay national legislators. 6 ' His motion to amend the clause to replace the states with the national treasury touched off a debate that
replayed the arguments of June 22 and 23, but with less vehemence and
more conciliation.
Gouverneur Morris (a New Yorker who was a member of the Pennsylvania delegation) urged that it would be unfair to distant states to
saddle them with costs that would be higher than those of states near the
seat of government. 62 He then suggested that the national legislature exercise its discretion in setting its members' pay.6 3 In a comment that
modem readers might view with disbelief, he said, "[tihere
could be no
6
reason to fear that they would overpay themselves."
Pierce Butler of South Carolina renewed his arguments that the national legislators ought to be paid by the states, "particularly in the case
of the Senate, who will be so long out of their respective States, that they
will lose sight of their Constituents unless dependent on them for their
support., 6' But John Langdon of New Hampshire opposed Butler's position, stressing the unfairness of "oblig[ing] the distant States to bear the
expence [sic] of their members travelling to and from the Seat of Govt.""
Madison suggested, in a speech generally directed to issues other than
compensation, that the Constitution should fix "at least two extremes not
to be exceeded by the Natl. Legislre. in the payment of themselves." '6 7
A flurry of debate ensued, with most of the speakers rising to endorse
both the transfer of payment of Congress to the national treasury and the
trusting of Congress to set its own compensation. Only the Anti-Federalist Luther Martin of Maryland opposed these positions; Martin urged
that "[a]s the Senate is to represent the States, the members of it ought to
be paid by the States." 68 Daniel Carroll, another Marylander, objected:
"The Senate was to represent & manage the affairs of the whole, and not
to be the advocates of State interests. They ought then not to be depen'
dent on nor paid by the States." 69
The Convention then voted to have
the members of Congress paid out of the national treasury, nine states to
70
two.

The delegates then made an abortive attempt to specify the salaries of
Senators and Representatives, but none of the proposed rates of payment
could muster a majority. Finally, the delegates agreed to add the phrase
61. See 2 id at 290.
62. See id.
63. See id.

64. Id
65. Id.
66. 2 id. at 290-91.
67. 2 id. at 291.
68. 2 id at 292.
69. Id
70. New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia supported it;
Massachusetts and South Carolina
opposed it. See id. New York had departed the Convention on July 10, 1787.
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"to be ascertained by law" to the clause, leaving it to Congress to set its
own pay.7 1
On September 12, the Convention received the report of the Committee of Style and Arrangement, which prepared the second draft of the
Constitution (the handiwork of Gouverneur Morris). Article I, section 6
of this draft was carried over into the finished document, unchallenged
and unaltered, except for capitalizations added by the clerk who prepared the engrossed final copy of the Constitution for signing on Septem-

ber

17.72

C.

The Ratification Controversy and the Quest for Amendments

The compensation clause was caught up in the Anti-Federalist campaign to amend the Constitution before its adoption. Both the Anti-Federalists and those who sought to remain neutral in the ratification
controversy worried that the Constitution authorized a government so
powerful and so independent of the people that it would destroy the
states and the rights of the people. Such Federalists as John Jay and
Alexander Hamilton derided these fears as groundless, explaining that
the general government could exercise only those powers conferred on it
by the Constitution.7 3 Moreover, they contended, the people were the
ultimate sovereigns; how could the people violate their own rights?74
They also cited such provisions as Article I, Section 9, cataloguing a series of limitations on federal power, to refute the Anti-Federalist charge
that the Constitution conferred unlimited powers on the general government.7 5 Finally, the Federalists maintained, state governments were far
from bastions of liberty themselves; throughout the 1770s and 1780s they
had been responsible for the most frequent and blatant violations of individual rights.7 6
Unconvinced, the Anti-Federalists insisted that the Constitution provided few explicit limitations on governmental power, making even more
glaring the document's lack of a bill of rights." They brushed aside the
Federalists' attacks on state governments, pointing out that the powers of
a new, untried federal government was the issue under debate. Furthermore, they refused even to consider the argument (so popular with Federalist polemicists) that the people could not violate their own rights.
Clinging to the traditional view that the government and the people were
and could only be adversaries, Anti-Federalists could not embrace the
71. See 2 id. at 292-93.
72. See 2 id. at 593.
73. See The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); John Jay, An Address to the
People of the State of New York (1788), reprintedin 3 The Correspondence and Public
Papers of John Jay 1763-1826, at 294-319 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1971).
74. See The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
75. See id.
76. See The Federalist No. 48 (James Madison).
77. See Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For: The Political
Thought of the Opponents of the Constitution 64-70 (1981).
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new Federalist theories of popular sovereignty. The Anti-Federalists also
knew that many Americans who were otherwise friendly to the Constitution shared their views on the need to limit the federal government's
power over the rights of the people.78
As this debate developed both within and without the ratifying conventions, the Constitution's lack of a bill of rights limiting the powers of
the general government over the individual became the Anti-Federalists'
most compelling argument against the document. Anti-Federalists
pointed to state constitutions that either began with declarations of
rights, as in Virginia and Massachusetts, or incorporated rights-protecting provisions, as in New York. 9 That the Constitution created a govemment possessing power over individual citizens, they insisted, meant
that, like the state constitutions it resembled, it ought to include provisions defining and protecting rights.
The defects that the Anti-Federalists perceived in the Constitution
only began, however, with its lack of a declaration of individual rights.
The new charter's opponents also demanded amendments limiting federal powers to levy taxes and to regulate interstate and foreign commerce- changes that would have reduced the Constitution to little more
than a redrafted Articles of Confederation. They also insisted that the
proposed Constitution be revised or fully rewritten before its adoption;
many Anti-Federalists even favored submitting it to a second constitutional convention."0 Still, the demand for a bill of rights became the ideological centerpiece and the intellectual core of the case against the
Constitution.
Several Anti-Federalist strategists and polemicists saw the compensation clause as a useful peg on which to hang what modern political analysts call "red-meat" arguments designed to provoke visceral responses
against the Constitution.8 1 For example, on June 14, 1788, Patrick
Henry turned the full force of his derisive oratory in the Virginia ratify78. See id. passim.
79. See the suggestive essay by Donald S. Lutz, The US Bill of Rights in Historical
Perspective, in Contexts of the Bill of Rights 3-17 (Stephen L. Schechter & Richard B.
Bernstein eds., 1990). Lutz maintains that the principal influences on the American
rights tradition as codified in the Bill of Rights were state constitutions, declarations of
rights, and colonial charters.
80. Kenneth R. Bowling has produced the authoritative modem examination of this
point. See Kenneth R. Bowling, ' 4Tub to the Whales" The Founding Fathersand Adoption of the FederalBill of Rights, 8 J. Early Republic 223 (1988). For an analysis that
recapitulates many of Bowling's arguments, see Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the
Bill ofRights A Reluctant Paternity,in 1990 Sup. CL Rev. 301.
81. See Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy 64-101 (1992) (discussing "visceral responses and stereotypes that foil argument");
William Safire, Bush's Gamble, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1992, (Magazine), at 31 (illustrating
"red-meat" rhetoric). Probably because they recognized that arguments over the clause

might produce a no-win scenario for their cause, the authors of The Federalist nowhere
discussed the compensation clause.
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ing convention against the compensation clause.8 2 In his reply, James
Madison was hard-pressed to defend the clause, conceding the apparent
impropriety of permitting the legislators to determine their own rate of
compensation and halfway acknowledging the necessity and appropriateness of amending the clause.8 " Governor Edmund Randolph, who had
proposed the Virginia Plan only to turn against the finished Constitution
by the end of the Convention, published a pamphlet setting forth his reasoning. Among the corrections he desired to "obnoxious" clauses of the
Constitution, he included "incapacitating the Congress to determine
their own salaries." 4 Further, in April 1788, an anonymous Philadelphia newspaper pamphleteer, "A Farmer," attacked the clause in the
Freeman'sJournal, citing it as proof that the government authorized by
the Constitution was not truly federal but national, and that the national
legislators would be independent of control by the states. 85
Given the public obsession with parsimony that dominated politics in
the New England states, it is not surprising that New Englanders seemed
most incensed over the compensation clause. On December, 1787, the
pseudonymous Massachusetts newspaper essayist "Cornelius" fired a detailed salvo at the compensation clause in a two-part essay published in
the Hampshire Chronicle, a newspaper appearing in one of the counties
where Shays's Rebellion had found its greatest popularity.8 6 Noting that
federal Representatives and Senators apparently were under no obligation to listen to instructions adopted by their constituents, "Cornelius"
demanded:
Is it altogether certain, that a body of men elected for so long a
term,-rendered thus independent, and most of them placed at the distance of some hundreds of miles from their constituents, will pay a
more faithful regard to their interest, and set an example of economy,
more becoming the circumstances of this country, than they would do,
if they were annually elected, subject to some kind of instructions, and
liable to be recalled, in case of male administration [sic] [i.e.,
maladministration].8 7
"Cornelius" also challenged the implication that the clause was neces82. See 3 Records, supra note 3, at 312-13 (extract from the debates of the Virginia
Convention, June 14, 1788).
83. See 3 id. at 313-15. James McHenry's defense of the clause in the Maryland
ratifying convention was similarly hesitant and half-hearted. See 3 id. at 148.
84. Edmund Randolph, Letter from Edmund Randolph Giving His Reasons for Refusing His Signature To the Proposed Federal Constitution (Oct. 10, 1787), reprintedin 2
The Complete Anti-Federalist 83-97 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); see also Samuel
Chase, Notes of Speeches Delivered to the Maryland Ratifying Convention (April 1788),
reprinted in 5 The Complete Anti-Federalist, supra, at 79-91.
85. See "A Farmer," The Fallaciesof the Freeman Detected by A Farmer, (Philadel-

phia) Freeman's Journal, Apr. 1788, reprintedin 3 The Complete Anti-Federalist, supra
note 84, at 181-93.
86. See "Essay by Cornelius," Hampshire Chronicle, Dec. 11 & 18, 1787, reprintedin
4 The Complete Anti-Federalist, supra note 84, at 138-46.
87. 4 id. at 140-41.
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sary to ensure a fair rate of compensation for members of the new
Congress:
Have the several states, in the estimation of the compilers of this
Constitution, been hitherto, so parsimonious and unjust in paying their
delegates, that they have rendered themselves unfit to contract with
their Senators and Representatives, respecting a compensation for their
service? If so, what may we suppose will be considered as a just compensation, when this honourable Body shall set their own pay, and be
accountable to none but themselves?" s
In his second part, "Cornelius" answered the Federalist argument that
since state legislatures set their own pay, Congress should be able to do
the same. First, "Cornelius" insisted that there were great differences
between the cases of the state and national legislatures. On the one hand,
he pointed out, state legislators were known personally to their constituents, were elected for short (annual) terms, and could be bound by specific instructions from their constituents. By contrast, members of
Congress were to be chosen to serve for several years, by large blocs of
constituents to whom they might not be personally known. Moreover,
"Cornelius" argued, members of Congress would be far removed from
the interests and day-to-day conditions of their constituents, and exposed
to "the enchanting example of Ambassadors, other publick [sic] Ministers, and Consuls from foreign courts, who, both from principles of policy, and private ambition, will live in the most splendid and costly
style."89 Pointing out the dangers of emulation, "Cornelius" declared:
Let any body of men whatever be placed, from year to year, in circumstances like these; let them have the unlimitted controul [sic] of
the property of the United States; and let them feel themselves vested,
at the same time, with a constitutional right, out of this property to
make themselves such compensation as they may think fit: And then,
let any one judge, whether they will long retain the same ideas, and feel
themselves under equal restraints90as to fixing their own pay, with the
members of our state legislature.
"Cornelius" concluded:
This part of the Constitution... [is] calculated, not only to enhance
the expense of the federal government to a degree that will be truly
burdensome; but also, to increase that luxury and extravagance, in
general, which threatens the ruin of the United States; and that, to
which the Eastern States in particular, are wholly unequal. 9 '
On January 10, 1788, "Samuel" contributed a short essay to the Independent Chronicle and UniversalAdvertiser,9 2 in which the writer also
88. 4 id,at 141.
89. Id
90. 4 id at 141-42.
91. 4 id at 142.
92. "Essay by Samuel," (Boston) Independent Chronicle and Universal Advertiser,
Jan. 10, 1788, reprintedin 4 The Complete Anti-Federalist, supra note 84, at 191-97.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

tried to stress the supposed unfairness of the compensation clause to the
New England states. He wrote: "These Representatives are to set their
own wages, to be paid out of the Continental Treasury; therefore the
New England States will have to pay nearly every fifth dollar, to support
Representatives in 93
the other States, according to the apportionment in
said Constitution.
The next day, in New Hampshire, another Anti-Federalist writer (also
styling himself "A Farmer") observed, in the Freeman's Oracle and New
Hampshire Advertiser, "The truth is, when you carry a man's salary beyond what decency requires, he immediately becomes
a man of conse94
quence, and does little, or no business at all."
On February 8, 1788, in New Hampshire, "A Friend to the Rights of
the People" attacked the compensation clause in the Freeman's Oracle.9"
He added little to the arguments that the writers already discussed had
presented, but what he lacked in theoretical originality he made up in
rhetorical flair. He wrote:
How far Congress will extend this power ...there is no man alive
can tell-It is left without bound or limitation-and we may be sure,
from the craving appetites of men for gain, it will be stretched as far as
the patience, and abilities of the people will bear-European fashions
have been transplanted into America-The high taste of foreign
Courts will be relished by Congress- They must live in all the splendor of equipage and attendance-Their revenue must be equivalentThis being an infant country, and besides
loaded with a large debt, will
96
by no means be able to support it.
The writer concluded with an analogy calculated to appeal to ordinary
New England farmers and tradesmen: "No wise householder will let her
servants make a law to fix their own wages, or dip as deep as they please
in his coffers-Nor will any wise community give a greater liberty to the
ruling servants of the state .. .
Finally, on January 17, 1788, the noted South Carolina lawyer and
state legislator Rawlins Lowndes sought to draw ominous parallels between the proposed Constitution's nationalizing tendencies and Britain's
attempts to choke off the independence of the colonial governments
before 1776:
Why take from us the right of paying our delegates, and pay them
from the federal treasury? He remembered formerly what a flame was
raised in Massachusetts, on account of Great Britain assuming the
93. 4 id. at 192.
94. "Essays by A Farmer," (New Hampshire) Freeman's Oracle and New Hampshire
Advertiser, Jan. 11, 1788, reprintedin 4 The Complete Anti-Federalist, supra note 84, at
207-08.
95. "A Friend to the Rights of the People," Anti-Foederalist,No. I, (New Hampshire)
Freeman's Oracle, Feb. 8, 1788, reprintedin 4 The Complete Anti-Federalist, supra note
84, at 235-42.
96. 4 id. at 238.
97. Id.
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payment of salaries to judges and other state officers; and that this

conduct was considered as originating
in a design to destroy the inde98
pendence of their government
The informal argument over the Constitution formed the context
within which the formal actions of the state ratifying conventions took
place. Within the conventions, beginning with that of Massachusetts in
February 1788, moderates in the Federalist and Anti-Federalist camps
developed the device of recommended amendments, which would be submitted to the first Congress to convene under the Constitution, should it
be adopted. Previously, Federalists had insisted that the Constitution had
to be adopted as it was, with no possibility of amendment while AntiFederalists had demanded that the document be amended before they
would support its adoption. The tactic of recommended amendments
broke the rhetorical logjam, permitting Anti-Federalists to support the
Constitution while binding the Federalists to support the submission of
these lists of amendments to Congress.99

The amendments proposed by the ratifying conventions illustrate the
neat division between those that would protect individual rights or enshrine fundamental principles of government, and those that would cripple the government created by the Constitution. The Virginia and New
York conventions took pains in their instruments of ratification to separate rights-declaring amendments from amendments altering the structure of government.
The proposed rights-declaring amendments covered virtually everything now found in the first ten amendments to the Constitution, so little
would have changed had every one of them been adopted as proposed.
If, however, even some of the structural amendments had been adopted,
the result would have been a dismemberment of the government set forth
in the Constitution. For instance, these proposals would have curtailed
the number of terms for the President, Senators, and Representatives;
abolished the Vice Presidency; limited the scope of jurisdiction of the
federal courts; forbidden Congress to create any court but a Supreme
Court and federal admiralty courts; restricted congressional powers of
taxation and regulation of interstate and foreign commerce; barred any
98. Rawlins Lowndes, Speech Before the South Carolina House of Representatives on
the Proposed Federal Constitution (January 17, 1788), in Debates Which Arose in the
House of Representatives of South Carolina on the Constitution Framed for the United
States by a Convention of Delegates Assembled at Philadelphia 26 (1788), reprintedin 5
The Complete Anti-Federalist, supra note 84, at 154. Lowndes was a Charleston member
of the South Carolina House of Representatives, which in January 1788 debated and
adopted legislation authorizing the calling of elections for a ratifying convention; on May
23, 1788, the convention voted to ratify the Constitution. Lowndes almost singlehandedly made the case against the Constitution in the House of Representatives, conceiving that his pro-Constitution constituents would not elect him to the convention.
Evidence indicates that Lowndes was elected to the ratifying convention, but declined to
serve. See 5 id at 148-49.
99. See Richard B. Bernstein with Kym S. Rice, Are We to be a Nation? The Making
of the Constitution 207 (1987).
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exercise of federal power to raise revenue unless and until the states refused to comply with congressional requisitions; and required a twothirds vote of both houses of Congress for any statute regulating commerce, any tax law, and any treaty." °° Given the unhappy fate of the
Articles of Confederation, it is doubtful whether such an eviscerated
form of government would have lasted long.
By far the least sweeping of the structural amendments were those proposed by Virginia, New York, and North Carolina to the compensation
clause:
Virginia
That the laws ascertaining the compensation of senators and representatives for their services, be postponed in their operation, until after
the election of representatives immediately succeeding the passing
thereof; that excepted, which shall first be passed on the subject.' 0 '
New York
That the compensation for the senators and representatives be ascertained by standing laws; and that no alteration of the existing rate of
compensation shall operate for the benefit of the representatives, until
after a subsequent election shall have been had. 102
North Carolina
That the laws ascertaining the compensation of senators and representatives for their services, be postponed in their operation, until after
the election of representatives immediately succeeding and passing
10 3
thereof, that excepted, which shall first be passed on the subject.
In response to the structural amendments, some Federalists tried to
stonewall, linking the call for any amendments, including rights-declaring amendments, to the more extreme structural proposals. They feared
that any attempt to answer the public demand for a bill of rights would
open the door wide to potentially disastrous "alterations," especially in
100. See Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from the First Federal
Congress 14-28 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter Creating the Bill of Rights];
The Ratifications of the New Foederal Constitution, Together with the Amendments,
Proposed by the Several States (Aug[ustine] Davis ed., 1788), reprintedin Contexts of the
Bill of Rights, supra note 79, at 112-46.
101. Form of Ratification, which was read and agreed to by the Convention of Virginia
(June 25, 1788), in The Ratifications of the New Foederal Constitution, together with the
Amendments, Proposed by the Several States (Aug[ustine] Davis ed., 1788), reprintedin
Contexts of the Bill of Rights, supra note 79, at 137.
102. Ratification of the Constitution by the Convention of the State of New-York (July
26, 1788), in The Ratifications of the New Foederal Constitution, together with the
Amendments, Proposed by the Several States (Aug[ustine] Davis ed., 1788), reprintedin
Contexts of the Bill of Rights, supra note 79, at 119.
103. State of North-Carolina In Convention (Aug. 2, 1788), reprinted in Contexts of
the Bill of Rights, supra note 79, at 143. The leading student of North Carolina's ratification of the Constitution has concluded that the North Carolina convention closely followed the text of the Virginia amendments. See Louise Irby Trenholme, The Ratification
of the Federal Constitution in North Carolina 184 (1932).
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light of the New York and Virginia legislatures' threats to demand a
second convention to secure the alterations they had specified. 0 4 Moderate Federalists, however, recognized both the binding nature of their
pledges to the state ratifying conventions and the likelihood that rightsprotecting amendments would do no harm and might achieve much
good. This was the posture of the amendments issue (including the
amendments to the compensation clause) in the winter of 1788-1789, as
the first federal elections took place." 5
II.

FRAMING: THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS

When the First Congress convened on March 4, 1789 (and assembled
its quorum to do business by April 6), it had before it recommendations
for amendments from the ratifying conventions of five states-Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, and New York.106 In
addition to these, Anti-Federalist newspapers and pamphleteers circulated the lists of demands promulgated by the Anti-Federalist minority of
the Pennsylvania ratifying convention10 7 and the amendments demanded
by the North Carolina convention, whose Anti-Federalist majority had
refused even to vote on the Constitution unless it were amended first.""
Rhode Island thus far had refused even to hold elections for a ratifying
convention; its opposition to the Constitution and its support for a declaration of rights were well-known." °
The question of amendments was one of the trickiest and riskiest facing the new government. Federalists who were willing to consider rightsdeclaring amendments in order to promote conciliation and harmony (as
well as to repair a defect that began to look both obvious and ominous)
found themselves divided from those who regarded any attempt to
amend a Constitution just adopted as a conspiracy to commit sabotage. 1 It was essential, they perceived, to stake out a temperate posi104. See Bernard Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind 162-63 (enlarged ed. 1992).
105. See id. at 160-86. Apparently the issue of congressional power to set congressional compensation played no role in the first federal elections. See Bernstein,supra note
7, ch. 4.
106. See Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 14-28; The Ratifications of the
New Foederal Constitution, Together with the Amendments, Proposed by the Several
States (Aug[ustine] Davis ed., 1788), reprinted in Contexts of the Bill of Rights, supra
note 79, at 112-46. North Carolina and Rhode Island submitted their lists of recommendations in November 1789 and May 1790, respectively, once they ratified the Constitution; however, within a month after each state ratified the Constitution, its legislature also
ratified the amendments proposed by Congress in 1789. See infra notes 109, 176 (Rhode
Island); supra note 103 (North Carolina); infra note 175 (same).
107. See The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention ofPenn-

sylvania To Their Constituents, Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, Dec. 18, 1787,
reprintedin 3 The Complete Anti-Federalist, supra note 84, at 145-67.
108. See supra note 103.

109. See Bernstein with Rice, supra note 99, at 270-71; Patrick T. Conley, Democracy
in Decline: Rhode Island's Constitutional Development, 1776-1841, at 105-42 (1977);
Irwin H. Polishook, Rhode Island and the Union, 1774-1795, at 213-23, 226-31 (1969).
110. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

tion-one that could secure the support of moderates in both the
Federalist and the Anti-Federalist camps, while not goading extremists
on either side to action that would cripple the government. These Federalists agreed that the best course would be to launch the promised campaign to add a bill of rights to the Constitution.
Leadership to obtain a bill of rights from the First Congress came from
someone who, only a year earlier, would have been a most unlikely candidate for the role-James Madison, who had reversed his stand from the
opening stages of the struggle for ratification. His about-face was the
most noteworthy development in the ratification controversy with respect to future amendments. Madison brought many strengths to the
movement for a declaration of rights: his national political stature; his
ability to secure President Washington's backing of the call for amendments securing individual rights; and his extraordinary intellectual talents and capacity for hard work.
At first Madison had been cool to the idea of adding a bill of rights to
the Constitution. His experience with Virginia politics in the 1780s, and
his scrutiny of politics on both state and national levels, had led him to
conclude that a bill of rights would be insufficient to restrain a government or a popular majority bent on violating rights. Madison explained
his thinking in a letter to Jefferson in 1788: "[E]xperience proves the
inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its controul [sic] is
most needed. Repeated violations of these parchment barriershave been
committed by overbearing majorities in every State." 1 1 Such arguments
carried great force, especially among veterans of the tumultuous state
politics of the 1780s, who had seen firsthand the ineffectiveness of state
constitutional provisions guaranteeing rights against determined legislative and popular majorities.
Eighteenth-century opinions on the nature of a declaration of rights
and its function in the life of a polity differed profoundly from today's
understandings of the same questions. Declarations of rights originally
were not legally enforceable limitations on government power. Rather,
they were political documents, enshrining the people's values and providing the citizenry a standard for evaluating the performance of elected
officials.l' They were generally phrased as admonitions, stating that the
111. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 The Papers of James Madison 295, 297 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977) (emphasis added)
(discussing Madison's role in the origins of the Bill of Rights and his thinking on the
concept of "parchment barriers") [hereinafter Madison Papers]; see also Jack N. Rakove,
ParchmentBarriersand the Politics of Rights, in A Culture of Rights 98-143 (Michael J.
Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991) (analyzing the transformation of the theory underlying the protection of rights, from the colonial period through the constitutional
debates).
112. See Donald S. Lutz, The U.S. Bill of Rights in HistoricalPerspective, in Contexts
of the Bill of Rights, supra note 79, at 3-17; Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional
Provisions: 1776-1791, in William E. Nelson & Robert C. Palmer, Liberty and Community: Constitution and Rights in the Early American Republic 55-148 (1987).
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government "ought" to do this or "should not" do that. Government
officials could, and did, ignore such political guidelines, however, with
virtual impunity
from popular reaction and even with popular
13
approval.'
In his arguments for the federal Constitution, Madison used the state
governments' inability to abide by their own constitutions with telling
effect. In The FederalistNo. 48, for example, he itemized the many violations of specific provisions of the Pennsylvania constitution of 1776catalogued by the 1783 report of the state's Council of Censors-abuses
that had been, and continued to be, tolerated by the people of the state:
The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from these observations is, that a mere demarkation [sic] on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a sufficient guard against
those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all
the powers of government in the same hands.1 14
It is not surprising that Madison at first found the "parchment barriers" argument persuasive. He believed that the plan for representation in
the national legislature of an extended republic (which he defended in
The FederalistNo. 10) and the Constitution's devices of checks and balances (which he vindicated in The FederalistNo. 51 ) provided a solution
to the problem of government abuse of power that was both theoretically
satisfying and workable in practice, and on both counts more secure than
formal declarations of rights could ever be. Thus, Madison at first resisted adding a declaration of rights to the Constitution at least in part
because he believed that the new Federalist science of politics he had
helped devise could better perform the tasks most Americans assigned to
a declaration of rights. 1
A veteran drafter of constitutions and legislation, Madison understood
the limitations of legal and political language--especially vague admonitory language-as a means to achieve political ends."I6 He believed that
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to draft a bill of rights that would
give sufficient protection to the rights it mentioned; he also knew that it
was possible that a bill of rights might give protection so broad as to
paralyze the needed powers of government. Finally, he feared that it
would be all too easy to leave some rights out by mistake, with the result
that those rights would not be protected.
113. See sources cited supra note 112.
114. The Federalist No. 48, at 338 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
115. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: 1. Foundations 165-266 (1991); Fame and
the Founding Fathers: Essays by Douglass Adair 93-106 (Trevor Colbourn ed., 1974);
Michael Foley, Laws, Men and Machines: Modem American Government and the Appeal of Newtonian Mechanics 144-45 (1990); Jack N. Rakove, James Madison and the
Creation of the American Republic 44-52 (1990); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the
American Republic, 1776-1787, at 469-564, 593-615 (1969).
116. See The Federalist No. 37 (James Madison) for a masterful analysis of the consequences for constitutional and political problem-solving of the imprecision and ambiguity
of language.
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Despite his struggles against the demand for a declaration of rights, in
late 1788 Madison became determined to lead the effort to amend the
Constitution. Four linked reasons explain his about-face:
* First, Madison received a series of admonishing and persuasive letters between late 1787 and the summer of 1789 from his friend Thomas
Jefferson, then American Minister to France and a keen observer of the
ratification controversy. 117 Taking pains to refute each argument that
Madison raised against a declaration of rights, Jefferson reminded
Madison that a "bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against
every government on earth, general or particular, [and] what no just government should refuse or rest on inference." 1 1 He also rebutted
Madison's fears that "a positive declaration of some essential rights could
not be obtained in the requisite latitude" by asserting that "half a loaf is
better than no bread. [I]f we cannot secure all our rights, let us secure
what we can." 1 19 The Jefferson-Madison correspondence served not simply as a source of intellectual and personal leverage on Madison, but also
as an indication to him that moderate Federalists throughout the nation
might well think as Jefferson did. The correspondence also provided
Madison with a valuable catalogue of arguments that he would later use
to persuade reluctant Federalist colleagues in the House and the Senate
to support his amendments.
P Second, Madison's close observation of the American political
scene and the communications he received from friends and political allies around the nation in 1788-1789 helped to convince him that Americans of all persuasions would rest easier if a bill of rights were added to
the Constitution. Moreover, as the leader of the campaign for amendments within Congress, Madison knew that he would have the most advantageous position from which to ward off any proposed amendments
that might go beyond a bill of rights.' 2 0
o Third, Madison feared that diehard Anti-Federalists in New York
and Virginia would carry out their oft-repeated threat to seek a second
117. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 10
Madison Papers, supra note 111, at 335-39; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Feb. 6, 1788), in 10 id. at 473-75; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (July 31, 1788), in 11 id. at 210-14; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Nov. 18, 1788), in 11 id. at 353-55; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in 12 id. at 13-16; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 12 id. at 360-65. For Madison's response to Jefferson's
letters, see Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 id. at
295-300; Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 8, 1788), in 11 id. at 38184; Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 27, 1789), in 12 id. at 185-86;
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 13, 1789), in 12 id. at 217-18;
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), in 12 id. at 267-72.
118. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 10 Madison
Papers, supra note 111, at 335-39.
119. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in Creating the
Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 219.
120. See Rakove, supra note 115, at 79.
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convention. If he could assume leadership of the quest for amendments
within Congress, he reasoned, he might be able to deflect the momentum
of the second-convention movement or even stop it altogether. Even
though only these two states had adopted resolutions making clear their
intention to demand a new convention, Virginia and New York were
nonetheless among the most powerful states in the Union. As the largest
and most populous state (and the home state of the likely first President),
Virginia wielded extraordinary political and economic power in American affairs. New York, the home of the new nation's temporary capital
and fastest-growing port, was not far behind Virginia. Had Anti-Federalists in both states succeeded in making common cause against the Constitution in 1788, they might well have derailed the momentum that the
Federalists had managed to build for the new government. Should these
two states indeed issue calls for a convention, Madison worried, other
states might follow the lead of Virginia and New York-unless he placed
an alternative on the agenda of Congress.' 2 '
* Fourth, and of most direct personal concern, Madison recalled the
role that the demand for amendments had played during the federal elections of 1788-1789, when he ran for a seat in the first United States
House of Representatives against his friend, and fellow protege of Jefferson, James Monroe.' 2 2 Virginia Anti-Federalists launched a whispering
campaign charging that Madison still opposed a bill of rights despite his
public pledge, which they suspected had been only a ruse to lure wavering delegates to support ratification. They hoped that this charge would
alienate the Baptist community, who were not only among Madison's
staunchest supporters, but were also among the strongest advocates of a
bill of rights. Madison gained election to the House largely because he
refuted these charges, in person and in writing, publicly reaffirming his
promises to work for the adoption of a federal bill of rights."
Thus, when the First Congress convened the following spring,
Madison was already hard at work, studying with great care a pamphlet
published by Augustine Davis, a Virginia printer, which set forth the
more than two hundred amendments to the Constitution recommended
by the ratifying conventions.' 2 4 Madison realized that the existence of
this pamphlet, and its wide-spread circulation, confirmed that the ques121. See Bowling, supra note 80, at 227-34; Linda Grant DePauw, The Anticlimax of
Antifederalism: The Abortive Second Convention Movement, 1788-89, 2 Prologue 98
(1970); Edward P. Smith, The Movement Towards a Second ConstitutionalConvention in
1788, in Essays in the Constitutional History of the United States in the Formative Period, 1775-1789, at 46-115 (J. Franklin Jameson ed., 1970).
122. See Harry Ammon, James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity 75-77
(1971); Irving Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1787-1800, at 236-42
(1950); 2 The Documentary History of the First Federal Elections: 1788-1790, at 310-65
(Gordon DenBoer et al. eds., 1984).
123. See sources cited supra note 122.
124. See The Ratifications of the New Foederal Constitution, Together with the
Amendments, Proposed by the Several States, reprintedin Contexts of the Bill of Rights,
supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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tion of amendments was still alive. He therefore scoured its pages, identifying redundancies and sorting out those amendments that were
designed to identify and protect rights from those that would otherwise
alter the structure of government provided for by the Constitution.
Madison used other political demands on his time and energies to advance the cause of amendments. At the same time that he immersed
himself in the Davis pamphlet, he consulted with President-elect George
Washington, who had arrived in the capital city on April 23. On April
30, in his first inaugural address (either drafted by Madison or approved
by him beforehand), Washington made only one substantive recommendation to the First Congress which he expressed with the overbalanced,
ponderous eloquence characteristic of his formal statements. Acknowledging "the nature of objections which have been urged against the system, or ...the degree of inquietude which has given birth to them,' 1 25
Washington disclaimed any ability or desire to use his authority to guide
the amending process-and then proceeded to do just that:
Instead of undertaling particular recommendations on this subject, in
which I could be guided by no lights derived from official opportunities, I shall again give way to my entire confidence in your discernment
and pursuit of the public good. For I assure myself that whilst you
carefully avoid every alteration which might endanger the benefits of
an united and effective government, or which ought to await the future
lessons of experience; a reverence for the characteristic rights of
freemen, and a regard for the public harmony, will sufficiently influence your deliberations on the question, how far the former can be
more impregnably fortified, or the latter be safely and advantageously
promoted. 126
With Washington firmly in the moderate camp of amendment advocates, Madison judged it a good time to move forward. On May 4, 1789,
Madison first gave notice to his colleagues that he would act on the question of amendments, moving that the subject be raised on May 25. 127 He
thus stole the thunder of Anti-Federalist Representatives who had hoped
to focus the attention of the House on the Virginia and New York demands for a second convention.
Still determined to do his part for a second convention despite
Madison's actions, Representative Theodorick Bland of Virginia introduced his state's application for a second convention on May 5.128
Bland's New York colleague, John Laurance, submitted his state's application on May 6.129 The Virginia application sparked a brief and occa125. George Washington, Inaugural Address (Apr. 30, 1789), reprintedin Creating the
Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 233. On Madison's role in the drafting of this speech,
see Brant, supra note 122, at 255-56, 258.
126. Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 233-34.
127. See id. at 5.
128. See The Daily Advertiser, May 6, 1789, reprinted in Creating the Bill of Rights,
supra note 100, at 57-59; the text of the application appears in id. at 235-37.
129. See John P. Kaminski, The Making of the Bill ofRights: 1787-1792, in Contexts
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sionally testy debate: should the House appoint a select committee to
consider the application, or just lay it on the table until enough states'
applications were received to compel Congress to call a second convention?13 ° Madison proposed that all applications be laid upon the table as
they arrived, and that Congress wait until constitutional critical mass
was achieved. 3 1 Despite Bland's protests, the House adopted Madison's
views, and the Virginia and New York applications were tabled, never to
be heard from again.32 No other state sent Congress an application for a
1
second convention.

Madison had achieved the first of his two goals-the derailing of the
second convention movement. Yet, when the appointed day for discussion of amendments arrived three weeks later, he was forced to postpone
the question until June 8 to accommodate his colleagues' desire to complete work on legislation setting up federal systems of customs regulation
and revenue legislation. Once again, the majority of Representatives did
not share Madison's sense of urgency.
When June 8 arrived, Madison claimed recognition from the floor to
fulfill his promise to introduce the subject of amendments. He was confident of success, having worked hard to prepare a set of proposals which
would satisfy the goals that he and the President had set forth in Washington's inaugural address. With the people's expectations about to be
gratified, and the support of the President, how could he fail?
Madison's list of amendments included none that would limit the necessary powers of the general government.1 3 3 The Virginian aimed, instead, to state basic principles of republican government and to protect
individual rights. Virtually every one of the twelve amendments'M ultimately proposed by Congress in 1789-including the compensation
amendment demanded by Virginia, New York, and North Carolina-has
roots in Madison's list.1 35 He also included four provisions, derived from
the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the American Declaration of Independence, affirming the proposition that government is derived from
the people and is instituted to protect their liberty, safety, and happiness.
Madison stated that the people have an "indubitable, unalienable, and
indefeasible right to reform or change their government, whenever it be
of the Bill of Rights, supra note 79, at 18, 45. Kaminski misstates the New York Representative's name as Nathaniel Lawrence. The text of the application is reprinted in Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 237-38.
130. See The Daily Advertiser, May 6, 1789, reprintedin Creating the Bill of Rights,
supra note 100, at 57-58.
131. See id at 58.
132. See The Congressional Register, May 5, 1789, reprinted in Creating the Bill of
Rights, supra note 100, at 60-62.
133. See Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), reprintedin Creating the Bill of Rights,
supra note 100, at 11-14.
134. See Amendments to the Constitution (Sept. 28, 1789), reprintedin Creating the
Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 3-4.
135. See the table in Donald S. Lutz, A Preface to American Political Theory 56-60
(1992).
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found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution."'' 1 6 Finally, he included one other amendment not derived from any proposal-formal or informal-made during the ratification controversy: "No
state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the
press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."' 3 7
As for the compensation amendment, Madison deemed it worthy of
addition precisely because, and apparently only because, the conventions
of three states had demanded it. His version closely tracked their
proposals:
Thirdly. That in article Ist, section 6, clause I, there be added to the
end of the first sentence, these words, to wit: "But no law varying the
shall operate before the next ensuing
compensation last ascertained
138
election of representatives."'
Madison's discussion of this proposal was offhand, at best, drawing on
remarks that he had made at the Federal Convention two years before:
There are several lesser cases enumerated in my proposition, in
which I wish also to see some alteration take place. That article which
leaves it in the power of the legislature to ascertain its own emolument
is one to which I allude. I do not believe this is a power which, in the
ordinary course of government, is likely to be abused, perhaps of all
the powers granted, it is least likely to abuse; but there is a seeming
impropriety in leaving any set of men without controul [sic] to put
their hand into the public coffers, to take out money to put in their
pockets; there is a seeming indecorum in such power, which leads me
to propose a change. We have a guide to this alteration in several of
the amendments which the different conventions have proposed. I
have gone therefore so far as to fix it, that no law, varying the compensation, shall operate until there is a change in the legislature; in which
of those who are concerned
case it cannot be for the particular benefit
139
in determining the value of the service.
Finally, Madison discussed the form that the amendments should take.
He proposed that Congress rewrite the Constitution to incorporate the
amendments in their appropriate places in the 1787 text. Thus, for example, the compensation amendment would have revised Article I, Section 6, and the rights-declaring amendments would have been added to
136. Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), reprintedin Creating the Bill of Rights supra
note 100, at 11-12; see The Daily Advertiser, June 9, 1789, reprintedin Creating the Bill
of Rights, supra note 100, at 63-64; Gazette of the United States, June 10, 1789, reprinted
in id. at 66-68; The Congressional Register, June 8, 1789, reprinted in id. at 77-86. The
reported debates from all three newspapers are reprinted in Creating the Bill of Rights,
supra note 100, at 63-95. For the text of the amendments Madison offered, see id. at 1114. (Most legal scholars still cite to the version reprinted in 1 Annals of Cong. 448-59
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834). This source is based on the Congressional Register version).
137. Madison Resolution, supra note 133, at 13.
138. Id. at 12.
139. James Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in The
Congressional Register, June 8, 1789, reprintedin Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note
100, at 84.
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Article I, Section 9, which codified limits on the powers of Congress.' 40
Two letters that Madison received at the time suggest his success in
devising amendments that would meet the objectives defined in Washington's inaugural address. The first was a letter from George Washington,
in which the President praised the amendments and acknowledged their
importance:
As far as a momentary consideration has enable[d] me to judge, I see
nothing exceptionable in the proposed amendments. Some of them, in
my opinion, are importantly necessary, others, though of themselves
(in my conception) not very essential, are necessary to quiet the fears
of some respectable characters and well-meaning men. Upon the
whole, therefore, not foreseeing any evil consequences that can result
from their adoption,
they have my wishes for a favorable reception in
14
both houses.
Washington knew that Madison would find the letter useful in persuading colleagues to adopt his position. Three weeks later, the moderate
Virginia Anti-Federalist Joseph Jones wrote that the proposed amendments "are calculated to secure the personal rights of the people so far as
declarations on paper can effect' 142
the purpose, leaving unimpaired the
great Powers of the government."
Madison's colleagues in the House, however, were not so agreeable or
well-disposed as Washington and Jones. Congressional treatment of the
amendments issue shows that, while Madison led the fight for amendments, he was by no means omnipotent. Indeed, on June 8, Madison ran
into the legislative equivalent of a full-body block, as Representatives
protested that the business before them (revenue and customs legislation)
was too important to set aside, especially
for conjectures as to what re143
forms the Constitution might require.
140. See Madison Resolution, supra note 133, at 12.
141. Letter from George Washington to James Madison (May 31, 1789), reprintedin
Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 242.
142. Letter from Joseph Jones to James Madison (June 24, 1789), reprintedin Creating
the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 253.
143. The stark recitation of motions in the House Journalconveys little of the atmosphere of the debate in the House on Madison's amendments. It is very difficult, perhaps
impossible, to recapture that atmosphere or the exact structure and terms of the debates
themselves. Even though three New York City newspapers published reports of the
House debates, see Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 55-56, the accounts are
by no means complete or verbatim despite the tendency of legal scholars to assume their
completeness.
Legislative reporting was in its infancy in the early national period. Only in 1787-1788
(with widespread newspaper coverage of the ratification debates) had citizens, politicians,
and the "news media" of the time begun to appreciate the value and interest of newspaper
coverage of legislative business. Even with the newfound public taste for political news,
coverage of congressional proceedings was more of an oddity in 1789 than it might seem
to us today. The Senate did not open its debates to the public and the press until the
Gallatin election controversy of 1795, and Representatives made periodic protests against
the perceived bias and inaccuracy of the reporters. Occasionally, Congressmen even
made requests to expel reporters from debates and hearings. See generally Daniel Hoffman, Governmental Secrecy and the Founding Fathers: A Study in Constitutional Con-
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After a complex series of postponements and parliamentary maneuvers, 44 the Representatives spent most of their time on June 8 squabbling over whether amendments were necessary, rather than focusing on
the terms of Madison's proposal. James Jackson of Georgia argued that
amendments were not needed at all; both he and Connecticut's Roger
Sherman stressed the newness of the government authorized by the Constitution and protested that there had not been enough time to determine
what, if any, defects in the new system required amendment. 145
Madison stuck to his position, protesting, "I am sorry to be accessory
to the loss of a single moment of time by the house."'' 46 In defense of his
motion, he reminded his colleagues of the public's expectations, and of
his and his allies' promises in 1788:
If I thought I could fulfill the duty which I owe to myself and my
constituents, to let the subject pass over in silence, I most certainly
should not trespass upon the indulgence of this house. But I cannot do
this .... And I do most sincerely believe that if congress will devote
but one day to this subject, so far as to satisfy the public that we do not
disregard their wishes, it will have a salutary influence on the public
councils, and prepare the way for a favorable reception of our future
measures. It appears to me that this house is bound by every motive of
prudence, not to let the first session pass over without proposing to the
trols (198 1) (discussing the early history in America of the public's "right to know"); J.R.
Pole, The Gift of Government (1983) (discussing "right to know"); Langford, supra note
14, at 526, 705-06 (British practice); P.D.G. Thomas, The Beginnings of Parliamentary
Reporting in Newspapers, 1768-1774, 74 Eng. Hist. Rev. 623, 623-36 (1959) (same).

These protests were rooted in a related problem that complicates historical investigation of the First Congress. Technical and practical obstacles such as bad acoustics of the
House chamber and the lack of a practiced, reliable system of shorthand reporting prevented even the most assiduous and responsible reporter of debates from recording anything more than fragments of a typical legislative session. Thus, we should keep these
cautions firmly in mind as we sift through the surviving evidence of the First Congress.
For a useful article debunking legal scholars' assumptions about the character and
reliability of both Madison's notes and the surviving records of debates in the First Congress, see James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Docu-

mentary Record, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 1-39 (1986). Madison himself was perhaps the
greatest American recorder of debates of his time, as evidenced by his notes of the debates
in the Federal Convention. Yet he confided to contemporaries that the rigors of his selfassumed task almost killed him, and he never again made the attempt. Modern scholars
have concluded that Madison managed to preserve only a fraction of the actual debates in
the Convention. James H. Hutson of the Library of Congress, for example, has estimated
the proportion as about 10%. Hutson's strictures on these sources do not impeach their
credibility or usefulness for historicalinquiry, though he does not acknowledge this point,
and indeed seems unduly harsh on Thomas Lloyd, the journalist who compiled the most
complete surviving record of the House debates in the First Congress. See Creating the
Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 55-56 (discussion of Thomas Lloyd as parliamentary
reporter).
144. The legislative history of the Bill of Rights is traced in Creating the Bill of Rights,
supra note 100, at 1-53.
145. See The Congressional Register, June 8, 1789, reprinted in Creating the Bill of
Rights, supra note 100, at 70-72 (James Jackson), 73-74 (Roger Sherman).
146. James Madison, Speech of June 8, 1789, in The Congressional Register, June 8,
1789, reprintedin Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 77.
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state legislatures some things to be incorporated into the constitution,
as will render it as acceptable to the whole people of the United States,
as it has been found acceptable to a majority of them. 4 '

Madison emphasized four objectives: convincing the people of the trustworthiness of the new government; bringing the dissenting states of
North Carolina and Rhode Island back into the Union; redeeming a
campaign promise made by Federalists throughout the nation; and remedying a real defect in the Constitution. He then presented the amendments he thought necessary and explained and defended each in turn. It
was in this speech that Madison conferred on these amendments the
name, so powerful in political controversy at the time and so generally
revered afterward: "The first
of these amendments, relates to what may
148
be called a bill of rights."
The House ended its first debate on amendments by agreeing to set
down Madison's proposals for discussion at a later date by the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union. There matters rested
for six weeks, until July 21, when Madison sought to move that the
House go into Committee of the Whole House to take up his amendments. Upon this motion another wrangle ensued over the proper procedure for dealing with the amendments.
The House finally voted, thirty-four to fifteen, to appoint a select committee, with one member from each state, to report a set of draft amendments. 4 9 The committee worked quickly, producing a report listing
seventeen amendments, which on July 28 was ordered printed for the full
House.1 50 Six days later, on August 3, Madison successfully moved to
have the Committee of the Whole House take up the committee report
on August 12.
Without explanation, the House delayed this action by a day, but on
August 13, the Committee of the Whole House began its detailed debate
on the proposed amendments, clause by clause, concluding on August
18. The next day, the House began formal debate, reviewing the accomplishments of the previous week. Throughout this period, Anti-Federalist Representatives pleaded for amendments restricting the powers of the
federal judiciary and preserving state authority over congressional elections. The House rejected these requests; the Representatives were aware
of the need to walk a narrow line between protecting the rights of individuals and damaging the powers of the government. Further, they understood the challenge of drafting a declaration of rights that would be
147. Id at 77-78.
148. Id at 80.
149. This committee included Madison, Jacob Vining of Delaware, Abraham Baldwin
of Georgia, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, Nicholas Gilman of New Hampshire, George
Clymer of Pennsylvania, Egbert Benson of New York, Benjamin Goodhue of Massachusetts, Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, George Gale of Maryland, and Aedanus Burke of
South Carolina. See Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 6.
150. For the text of this report, with annotation indicating subsequent changes made
by the House in August, see id at 29-33.
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neither too constricted nor too expansive."' 1
Once it became clear that the House would propose amendments of
some sort, the discussion shifted to the choice of words and phrases, as
the Representatives groped for the right constitutional language. The
major characteristic of their draftsmanship was haste. For example,
what is today one of the most controversial clauses in the Bill of Rightsthe Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures-got through the House with only a few minutes of debate.' 5 2
The compensation amendment made its only extended appearance in
the debates of Congress during this stage of the process. On July 28,
1789, the committee named by the House to frame proposed amendments delivered its report. Its treatment of the compensation proposal
was as follows:
ART. I, SEC. 6 - Between the words "United States" and "shall in
all cases" strike out "they," and insert, "But no law varying the compensation shall take effect until 1an
53 election of Representatives shall
have intervened. The members."
On August 14, 1789, in debate in Committee of the Whole House, this
resolution was the focus of a listless and desultory discussion. The four
participants were all leading members of the House; three of themTheodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts, Jacob Vining of Delaware, and
James Madison of Virginia-were Federalists, while only one, Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts, was an Anti-Federalist. Sedgwick indicated his
familiarity with the practices of British candidates for the House of Commons of manipulating the wages questions before the custom of paying
wages died out altogether; Gerry sought to use the compensation amendment as a basis to revive Anti-Federalist concerns about the sufficiency of
representation in the House, a point that Madison was quick to refute;
and Vining, the spokesman for the committee, once more indicated the
matter-of-fact nature of the proposition in the minds of most Representatives. The entire surviving record is given below:
MR. SEDGWICK
Thought much inconvenience, and but very little good would result
from this amendment, it might serve as a tool for designing men, they
might reduce the wages very low, much lower than it was possible for
any gentleman to serve without injury to his private affairs, in order to
procure popularity at home, provided a diminution of pay was looked
upon as a desirable thing; it might also be done in order to prevent men
151. See John P. Kaminski, The Making of the Bill of Rights: 1787-1792, in Contexts
of the Bill of Rights, supra note 79, at 47-49.
152. See Debate in the Committee of the Whole House (August 17, 1789), in Gazette
of the United States, August 22, 1789, reprintedin Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note
100, at 181; The Congressional Register, August 17, 1789, reprintedin Creating the Bill
of Rights, supra note 100, at 187-88.
153. House Committee Report (July 28, 1789), reprintedin Creating the Bill of Rights,
supra note 100, at 30.
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of shining and disinterested abilities, but of indigent circumstances,
from rendering their fellow citizens those services they are well able to
perform, and render a seat in this house less eligible than it ought to
be.

MR. VINING
Thought every future legislature would feel a degree of gratitude to
the preceding one, which had performed so disagreeable a task for
them. The committee who had made this a part of their report, had
been guided by a single reason, but which appeared to them a sufficient
one, there was, to say the least of it, a disagreeable sensation, occasioned by leaving it in the breast of any man to set a value upon his
own work; it is true it was unavoidable in the present house, but it
might, and ought to be avoided in future; he therefore hoped it would
obtain without any difficulty.
MR. GERRY
Would be in favor of this clause, if they could find means to secure
an adequate representation, but he apprehended that would be considerably endangered, he should therefore be against it.
MR. MADISON
Thought the representation would be as well secured under this
clause as it would be if it was omitted; and as it was desired by a great
number of the people of America, he should consent to it, though he
was not convinced it was absolutely necessary.
MR. SEDGWICK
Remarked once more, that the proposition had two aspects which
made it disagreeable to him, the one was to render a man popular to
his constituents, the other to render the place ineligible to his
competitor.
He thought there was very little danger of an abuse of the power of
laying their own wages, gentlemen 15
were
generally more inclined to
4
make them moderate than excessive.
The reporter who recorded this unedifying debate then observed, "The
question being put on the proposition, it was carried in the affirmative, 27
for, and 20 against it."15
At this point the House, at the urging of Roger Sherman, abandoned
Madison's idea of incorporating the amendments in the constitutional
text. Sherman had two reasons for his demand. His first indicated his
respect for the canons of legal draftsmanship:
We ought not to interweave our propositions into the work itself,
because it will be destructive of the whole fabric. We might as well
endeavor to mix brass, iron and clay, as to incorporate such heteroge154. Debates in the House of Representatives (Aug. 14, 1789), in The Congressional
Register, Aug. 14, 1789, reprintedin Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 14950.
155. Id.at 150.
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neous articles; the one contradictory to the other. Its absurdity will be
discovered by comparing it with a law: would any legislature endeavor
to introduce into a former act, a subsequent amendment, and let them
stand so connected. When an alteration is made in an act, it is done by
way of supplement; the latter act always repealing the former in every
specified case of difference.' s6
Sherman's second reason, one of principle, was grounded in his understanding of the Constitution as an exercise of the constituent power by
the people of the United States through their delegates in the Federal
Convention and the state ratifying conventions:
The constitution is the act of the people, and ought to remain entire.
But the amendments will be the act of the state governments; again all
the authority we possess, is derived from that instrument [the Constitution]; if we mean to destroy the whole and establish 15
a new
constitu7
tion, we remove the basis on which we mean to build.
Despite the resistance of Madison and some of his colleagues, 5 ' the
House adopted Sherman's point of view. This vote set a precedent for all
future exercises of the amending power. The House's decision, setting
amendments aside from the rest of the Constitution, also led to the placement of the Bill of Rights at the head of the post-1787 text of the document, thus ensuring its primacy in popular imagination.' 5 9
On August 24, the House endorsed the seventeen draft amendments,
including the following text of the compensation amendment:
No law varying the compensation to the members of Congress, shall
take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have
intervened. 160
Once the amendments made their way up the stairs of Federal Hall to
the Senate the next morning, however, our detailed knowledge of the
debates evaporates. Unlike the House, which had a visitors' gallery and
several self-employed reporters recording the proceedings, the Senate
met behind closed doors. The only record of the Senate's actions appears
in its barebones Legislative and Executive Journals, which record mo156. Debates in the House of Representatives (Aug. 13, 1789), in The Congressional
Register, Aug. 13, 1789, reprintedin Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 117;
see also Schwartz, supra note 104, at 173-74 (describing debates over the proposed location of the amendments in the Constitution).
157. Debates in the House of Representatives (Aug. 13, 1789), in The Congressional
Register, Aug. 13, 1789, reprintedin Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 117.
On the concept of the constituent power, see Willi Paul Adams, The First American
Constitutions 63-65, 96-98 (1980).
158. Debates in the House of Representatives (Aug. 13, 1789), in The Congressional
Register, Aug. 13, 1789, reprintedin Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 105,
109, 118-19, 126.
159. See Morris, supra note 23, at 318.
160. House Resolution and Articles of Amendment (Aug. 24, 1789), reprintedin Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 38.
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tions and votes but not debates or individual speeches.'
We do know
that the Senate, which had only two Anti-Federalist members out of
twenty-two, was much less responsive to the desirability of amendments
than the House of Representatives; for, despite its Federalist majority,
the House had a higher proportion of Anti-Federalist members from key
states such as Virginia, New York, Massachusetts, and South Carolina.
The amendments produced by the Senate on September 14 embodied
the Senators' coolness. The Senate reduced the House's proposals from
seventeen to twelve and significantly weakened them. For example, the
House version of the religious-liberty provision clearly deprived Congress
of any power over religion:
Congress shall make no law establishing religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of Conscience be infringed.162
The Senate's version only barred Congress from creating an established
church like the Church of England:
Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith, or a mode
of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion ....163
By contrast, the Senate only slightly edited the language of the compensation amendment proposed by the House:
No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators
and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened. 64
Although Roger Sherman declared that, in his view, the amendments
had been "altered for the Better,"' 165 Madison was angered by the Sen161. See 1, 2 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress 1789-1791 (Linda
Grant De Pauw et al. eds., 1972, 1974) (publishing the Senate Legislative and Executive
Journals).
To the extent that we know anything of the Senate's debates, we are indebted to William Maclay of Pennsylvania. A veteran of his state's rough-and-tumble politics, Maclay
was a moderate Federalist from the western part of his state, elected to counterbalance
Philadelphia financier Robert Morris. He kept an acerbic and entertaining journal that is
by far our finest contemporary account of the launching of the new government. Unfortunately, like so many middle-aged men of his day (Maclay was in his early fifties), the
Pennsylvanian was a man of variable health and a hypochondriac. Just as the Senate was
about to begin debate on the amendments, Maclay experienced one of his periodic bouts
of illness and missed the sessions at which the amendments were reviewed, clause by
clause. See 9 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress 1789-1791 (Kenneth
R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988) (publishing the diary of William Maclay and
other notes on Senate debates).
162. House Resolution and Articles of Amendment (Aug. 24, 1789), reprintedin Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 38.
163. Articles of Amendment, as Agreed to by the Senate (Sept. 14, 1789), reprintedin
Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 48. The Senate also condensed the religious-liberty clauses with those clauses protecting freedom of speech, press, assembly,
and petition; the House accepted this revision.
164. Id.
165. Letter from Roger Sherman to Samuel Huntington (Sept. 17, 1789), in Creating
the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 297.
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ate's handiwork, or so Senator Paine Wingate of New Hampshire reported to his colleague John Langdon: "As to amendments to the
Constitution Madison says he had rather have none than those agreed to
by the Senate."' 166 Representative Fisher Ames of Massachusetts noted
that Madison believed that the Senate version lacked the "sedative Virtue" of the original House proposals, and Ames fretted that a "contest
67 on
this subject between the two houses would be very disagreeable."'1
1 68
A conference committee of three Representatives and three Senators
restored many of the twelve proposed amendments to the form favored
by the House; the House approved the final list of twelve on September
24, 1789, and the Senate followed suit in two votes on September 25 and
26.169 The House had no objection to the Senate's reworking of the compensation amendment. Clerks prepared fourteen engrossed copies; one
was sent to each of the thirteen states
and the fourteenth was retained in
170
the files of the federal government.
As we have seen, Madison originally arranged what we now know as
the Bill of Rights by reference to various provisions of the Constitution
needing revision. Even in the final form as proposed to the states, these
amendments appear in the order of the provisions they were intended to
modify.
Of the twelve amendments proposed by Congress, the first two had
nothing to do with rights. They pertained to the structure of Congress
(outlined in the first sections of Article I), responding to Anti-Federalist
critiques of that institution. The remaining ten amendments were intended to revise Sections 9 and 10 of Article I, which established limitations on the substantive powers of federal and state governments,
respectively.
The first-the reapportionment amendment-would have altered Article I, Section 2, by adding a rigid formula tying the size of the House of
Representatives to increases in population. 171 It was designed to protect.
the principles of representation deemed necessary to protect the people
against any danger to their liberties from the actions of their elected rep166. Letter from Paine Wingate to John Langdon (Sept. 17, 1789), in Creating the Bill
of Rights, supra note 100, at 297.
167. Letter from Fisher Ames to Caleb Strong (Sept. 15, 1789), in Creating the Bill of
Rights, supra note 100, at 297.
168. Madison, Sherman, and Vining were the House members of the conference committee; Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, Charles Carroll of Maryland, and William Paterson of New Jersey were the Senate members. See Creating the Bill of Rights, supra
note 100, at 10-11.
169. See id. at 3-4, 11.
170. Eleven of these official engrossed copies survive in various public and private repositories, including state archives, the Library of Congress, and the New York Public
Library. What lawyers would dub the "file copy" is on permanent display at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.
171. For the text of the reapportionment amendment, see Creating the Bill of Rights,
supra note 100, at 3.
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resentatives.172 This proposal provided that there should be one Representative for every 30,000 people until the House had 100 members, after
which there would be one Representative for every 40,000 people until
the House grew to 200 members. Congress then would establish a new
ratio, making sure that there was no more than one Representative for
every 50,000 people. Two centuries later, when the nation's population
exceeds 250,000,000, the proposed amendment would mandate a House
of more than 5,000 members rather than the present 435.173 The proposal now seems a quaint anachronism that failed to anticipate the growth
of the nation.
The second was the compensation amendment.
III.

A.

SUSPENDED ANIMATION

Ratifying the Amendments

Anti-Federalists divided over the amendments proposed by Congress.
Some, who had objected to the Constitution because it lacked a declaration of rights, welcomed the amendments and abandoned their distrust of
the new government. Others, who wanted to restrict the general government's powers over taxation and regulation of interstate and foreign
commerce, charged that the amendments produced by Congress only distracted the people from the serious flaws still present in the Constitution.
Federalists rejected these arguments with scorn, pointing out that those
who had painted themselves as friends of liberty now showed their true
colors by opposing the Bill of Rights.
The ratification process started quickly; several states adopted the
amendments almost as soon as the engrossed copies arrived.' 74 For example, North Carolina, one of the two hold-out states, ratified the
amendments on December 22, 1789, one month after the state's second
ratifying convention had adopted the Constitution (194 to 77). 1'" Rhode
Island was more stubborn. It took veiled threats of trade reprisals from
Congress, the refusal of President Washington to visit the state during
his fall 1789 tour of New England, and talk of secession from the Federalists of Providence and Newport before the state at last called a ratifying
convention to assemble in April 1790. The convention took nearly a
month to adopt the Constitution by a two-vote margin (34 to 32), 176 with
172. See Bowling, supra note 80, at 229, 236.
173. See Creating the Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at 3.
174. Those who are frustrated by the lack of reliable documentary evidence on the
intent of the framers of the Bill of Rights will be even more put out by an examination of
the scanty evidence of the intent of the ratifiers of the amendments. For the best available
examination of the amendments' adoption, see The Bill of Rights and the States (Patrick
T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1992).
175. See William S. Price, Jr., "There Ought to Be a Bill of Rights" North Carolina
Enters a New Nation, in The Bill of Rights and the States, supra note 174, at 424-42.
176. See Patrick T. Conley, Rhode Island. Laboratoryfor the "Lively Experiment," in
The Bill of Rights and the States, supra note 174, at 123-61.
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dozens of recommended amendments; less than two weeks later, on June
11, the Rhode Island legislature adopted the Bill of Rights.' 7 7
The amendments bitterly disappointed Anti-Federalists in the Virginia
legislature because none of them acted to rein in the powers of the general government over taxation and commerce. Following the lead of
their commander, Patrick Henry, they blocked action in the legislature's
upper house for months.
By March 4, 1791, nine states had ratified ten of the twelve proposed
amendments, leaving the proposals one state short of the required threefourths. On that date, Vermont joined the Union. The problem was that,
with Vermont's addition to the Union (and even its ratification of the Bill
of Rights on November 3), the number of necessary state ratifications
automatically rose from ten (out of thirteen) to eleven (out of fourteen).
With no word from Connecticut, Massachusetts, or Georgia, the focus
shifted back to Virginia. 7 8 Supporters of the amendments in the Virginia legislature revived them, mocking the diehard Anti-Federalists as
obstacles to the amendments they had demanded years before. Caught in
an uncomfortable political predicament, the Anti-Federalists at last gave

in to overwhelming pressure. On December 15, 1791, Virginia ratified all
but the first of the twelve proposed amendments, and added the third

through the twelfth to the Constitution as the Bill of Rights.' 79
Between 1789 and 1791, the first proposed amendment was ratified by
ten states and rejected by one.1 80 The compensation amendment was
adopted by only six states,18 1 with five rejecting it,1 82 making its ratifica177. See id. at 153.
178. There is no evidence that Georgia completed action to adopt the Bill of Rightsdue in part to the destruction of many of the state's early records during and after the
Civil War. It was formerly thought that Federalists in Connecticut and Massachusetts
blocked consideration of the amendments or engineered their rejection, but one modem
authority maintains that legislative inattention resulted in Massachusetts's failure to
adopt a formal instrument of ratification even though both houses of the legislature approved the Bill of Rights in 1790. See A History of the American Constitution 244
(Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry eds., 1990). Contra John M. Murrin, From Liberties to Rights: The Struggle in Colonial Massachusetts, in The Bill of Rights and the
States, supra note 174, at 63, 97 (Massachusetts legislatures rejected amendments).
179. See Warren M. Billings, "That All Men Are Born Equally Free and Independent":
Virginiansand the Origins of the Bill of Rights, in The Bill of Rights and the States, supra
note 174, at 362-66. In 1939, to mark the sesquicentennial of the Bill of Rights, the
legislatures of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Georgia ratified the first ten amendments.
See John P. Kaminski, The Making of the Bill of Rights: 1787-1792, in Contexts of the
Bill of Rights, supra note 79, at 18, 54-57.
180. New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, New Hampshire, New
York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Pennsylvania supported the amendment.
Delaware rejected the amendment. See Herman V. Ames, The ProposedAmendments to
the Constitution of the United States During the First Century of its History, in 2 Annual
Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1896, app. A at 320 (1897)
(calendar of amendments No. 295).
181. Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Delaware, Vermont, and Virginia.
See id. at 34-35, app. A at 317 (calendar of amendments No. 243).
182. New Jersey (November 20, 1789); New Hampshire (January 25, 1790); Pennsylvania (March 10, 1790); New York (March 27, 1790); and Rhode Island (June 15,
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tion impossible.
B. Stirrings in Limbo
As Congress worked in its desultory and hesitant fashion to frame
amendments to the Constitution, it spent about as much time and far
more energy on an issue closer to its members' hearts: establishing the
rate of compensation for Senators and Representatives. Bitter argument
in the summer and fall of 1789 resulted in a statute establishing that
Senators and Representatives were to be paid six dollars per day of actual
attendance at legislative sessions, as well as six dollars per day for time
spent traveling to and from the seat of the federal government. Effective
March 4, 1795, Senators would receive seven dollars per day-a discrimination justified by its advocates as necessary considering the longer
term
183
of service of Senators and their supposed greater distinction.
Thereafter, Congress altered its compensation only gradually, often
letting years, even decades, go by before attempting a new adjustment of
its pay."8 On March 8, 1817, Congress attempted a radical increase of
its salary, shifting from a per diem to a per annum rate of compensation. 185 Public outcry prompted Congress to repeal the salary legislation,
which had become a lightning-rod for criticism. So traumatized was
Congress by the public reaction that it did not attempt to enact new salary legislation for nearly forty years. Moreover, there was a flurry of
proposed amendments-some introduced by members of Congress,
others adopted by state legislatures and then submitted to Congress by
friendly Senators or Representatives-similar in substance to the 1789
compensation amendment, with three more following in 1822.186 Despite the repeal, the 1818 elections resulted in the defeats of several leading Senators and Representatives (including Daniel Webster, then a
Representative from New Hampshire, who did not return to Congress
until 1823).
Only in 1855 was Congress emboldened to alter the basis of its com1790). See id. It is ironic that New York rejected the amendment that its convention had
done so much to bring about. For subsequent action by New Jersey and New Hampshire, see infra note 214.
183. See 6 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress 1789-1791, at 1833-35
(Charlene Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986) (text of the legislative salaries
statute); 6 id. at 1835-45 (legislative history); 11 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress 1789-1791, at 1136-39, 1149-56, 1174-89, 1399, 1472-74 (Charlene Bangs
Bickford et al. eds., 1992) (debates in the House of Representatives). For executive salaries, see Leonard D. White, The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History 291-302
(1948).
184. The figures in this section are taken from Congressional Quarterly's Guide to
Congress 635-49, tbl. at 642 (4th ed. 1991) [hereinafter Guide to Congress]. Ironically,
this otherwise authoritative reference work makes no mention of the 1789 compensation
amendment.
185. See id. at 636.
186. See Ames, supra note 180, at 34-35, app. A at 333-34, 337 (listing five separate
resolutions received in late 1817 and early 1818, and three more in 1822).
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pensation to an annual salary, which it then held in place for ten years.
In 1866, Congress enacted legislation increasing its salary by twothirds,"8 7 which continued in effect until March 3, 1873, when Congress
attempted another salary increase. The 1873 "Salary Grab" Act' 8 8 authorized an increase at the end of the Forty-second Congress (1871-1873)
to $7,500, retroactive to the beginning of that Congress. The increase
thus provided all members with8 a9 $5,000 windfall-$2,500 per year for
each of the previous two years.'
The public outcry against the "salary grab" was, if anything, even
more explosive than that experienced in 1815. Senator Robert C. Byrd
writes in his history of the Senate, "Startled by the ferocity of the outcry,
members rushed to return their back pay to the Treasury or donate it to
charity."' 9 0 Legislators in Ohio found a novel way of signalling their
outrage and disgust with the national legislature. On May 6, 1873, the
Ohio General Assembly adopted three resolutions against the Salary
Grab Act. The first called for a constitutional amendment prohibiting
retroactive pay increases for Congress, which it termed "vicious and corrupting in the tendering"; the second ratified the 1789 compensation
amendment; the third demanded the repeal of the Salary Grab Act,
which it declared "unnecessary, uncalled for, and distasteful to the people of Ohio, and it is believed of the whole Union ... ." ' Although
Ohio's protest gesture helped to shame Congress into repealing the Salary Grab Act, no other state ratified the 1789 compensation amendment
at that time.
As in 1817-1818, members scrambled to avoid the political fallout
from the 1873 legislation. In the first two months of the first session of
the Forty-third Congress (1873-1875), five proposals were introduced in
Congress to amend the compensation clause of the Constitution; these
proposals aimed to revive the substance of the 1789 compensation
amendment without running the risk that the amendment already proposed by Congress but resting in limbo for over eight decades might be
given new life.1 92 And, in January 1874, Congress voted to repeal the
increase. Voters' wrath, however,
in the 1874 congressional elections
1 93
toppled members wholesale.
The history of congressional compensation in the twentieth century
187. See Guide to Congress, supra note 184, at 636-37.
188. See id.; 1 Byrd, supra note 9, at 309-10. For a more general discussion, see 2 id. at
347-59.
189. See supra note 188.
190. 2 Byrd, supra note 9, at 355.
191. 70 Ohio Laws 409-10, May 6, 1873, reprintedin 138 Cong. Rec. 56836 (daily ed.,
May 19, 1992) (documents supplementing remarks of Senator Byrd). Gregory Watson
notes that this reprint was the first time that Ohio's ratification was ever published in the
Congressional Record or in any other formal journal kept by Congress. Telephone Interview with Gregory D. Watson (June 24, 1992); see Miller & Dewey, supra note 5, at 9899.
192. See Ames, supra note.180, at 35, app. A at 395.
193. See 2 Byrd, supra note 9, at 355.
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illustrates the gradual transition from part-time to full-time government
and the emergence of politics as a distinct, full-time career-two developments largely unexamined, and even unrecognized, by most citizens. In
1907, Congress increased its annual salary to $7,500-a rate it maintained until 1925, when it voted an increase to $10,000 per year. During
the Great Depression, Congress voted twice to reduce its salary-to
$9,000 in 1932 and to $8,500 in 1933. These were the last pay cuts that
Congress gave itself. The following table illustrates further Congressional pay increases, many of which were accompanied by modifications
or increases of travel allowances, tax-exempt and taxable expense allowances, and rules at first authorizing but eventually eliminating outside
honoraria:
1935-1947:
$10,000
per year
1947-1955:
$12,500
per year
1955-1965:
$22,500
per year
1965-1969:
$30,000
per year
1969-1975:
$42,500
per year
1975-1977:
$44,600
per year
1977-1979:
$57,500
per year
1979-1982:
$60,662.50
per year
Dec. 1982-1983:
$69,800
per year (H)
July 1983:
$69,800
per year (S)
1984:
$72,600
per year
1985-1986:
$75,100
per year
Jan. 1987:
$77,400
per year
Mar. 1987-1989:
$89,500
per year
1990:
$96,600
per year (H)
$98,400
per year (S)
Jan. 1991:
$125,100
per year (H)
$101,900
per year (S)
Aug. 1991:
$125,100
per year (S)194
As congressional salaries and perquisites mounted, public resentment
of Congress grew. So, too, did the circumspection of Senators and Representatives, who sought to develop increasingly subtle and invisible
ways of ensuring that congressional salaries would continue to increase,
while avoiding the politically risky method of simply voting for pay-raise
legislation. In recent years, Congress has experimented with independent commissions-in the apparent hope that an independent commission's recommendation will strike the electorate as more nonpartisan and
reasonable than direct action by Congress. In 1955, for example, the
increase recommended by the Commission on Judicial and Congressional
Salaries (established by Congress in 1953) was approved by a vote of
Congress.1 95 In 1967, Congress set up the President's Commission on
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries, which was to make recom194. See Guide to Congress, supra note 184, at 637-49.
195. See id.
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mendations every four years that would take effect unless the Senate or
the House adopted a resolution blocking the proposed increase.' 96 In
1975, Congress voted to make its members eligible for cost-of-living-adjustments (COLAs) like those given to other federal employees-but
members still would have to vote on the record to authorize COLAs; in
1981, Congress adopted methods to dispense with the need for on-therecord votes to accept COLAs.1 97 After the Supreme Court's decision in
INS v. Chadha,'98 striking down legislative vetoes, Congress reconfigured
its 1967 legislation to provide that both the House and the Senate had to
adopt a resolution disapproving a pay increase (subject to veto by the
President) within thirty days of the date the President submits his
budget. 199
Senator Robert C. Byrd concluded his review of the history of congressional salaries with a melancholy observation:
[W]e will undoubtedly continue to struggle with the salary issue as
Congress moves into its third century. It is an issue that has, from the
beginning, borne the curse of political grandstanding, posturing, hypocrisy, and demagoguery-by members, the news media, and
others-thus feeding public opposition to congressional
pay increases,
2
and, in all probability, it will continue to do so. 00
Thus, as Senator Byrd noted, the public mood was ripe for a revival of
the 1789 compensation amendment-a proposal that he welcomed on the
merits, but the validity of which he questioned on constitutional
grounds.2 ° '

IV.

RESURRECTION

The modem story of the ratification of the compensation amendment
begins with Gregory D. Watson, an aide to Texas state senator Ric Williamson. Convinced that the amendment was still "live," Watson waged
a lonely ten-year campaign to add it to the Constitution despite the conventional wisdom-shared by most politicians, historians, and legal
scholars-that the 1789 proposal was a dead letter.
In 1982, while a sophomore majoring in economics at the University of
Texas-Austin, Watson was looking for a paper topic for a government
course; he discovered the unratified compensation amendment of 1789,
which seemed to him to have abiding relevance. Watson confirmed the
ratifications by Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Delaware,
Vermont, and Virginia that occurred between 1789 and 1791, when the
Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution and the compensation
amendment seemingly passed away. But Watson also discovered Ohio's
196.
197.
198.
199.

See id.
See id.
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
See 2 Byrd, supra note 9, at 357-58.

200. Id. at 359.
201. See id. at 358-59.
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action on the amendment in 1873.202 He concluded that the 1789
amendment was still validly before the states principally because, unlike
most recent proposed amendments, it has no internal time limit. Intrigued, he wrote a paper reporting and analyzing his discovery and urging that the amendment be adopted. But Watson received only a "C"
from his instructor, who told him that the amendment was a dead letter
and never would become part of the Constitution.
Despite the cold reception his paper received, Watson began and pursued a solitary, self-financed quest to revive the compensation amendment, encouraging state legislators throughout the United States to work
for its ratification.2 °3 Beginning with Maine in 19832' and Colorado in
1984,205 the states gradually responded to his arguments, and many of
those legislatures that did ratify the amendment cited his point that the
lack of a time limit confirms the amendment's "live" status.
Soon after the Colorado ratification, Watson discovered that Wyoming
had ratified the compensation amendment six years earlier. Reviving the
Ohio strategy in response to a 1977 congressional pay increase, the Wyoming legislature had acted on March 3, 1978, resolving that
the percentage increase in direct compensation and benefits was at
such a high level, as to set a bad example to the general population at a
time when there is a prospect of a renewal of double-digit inflation; and
...

increases in compensation and benefits to most citizens of the

United States are far behind these increases to their elected Representatives ....

206

No other state had followed Wyoming's lead, and it was only because of
the coverage of the Maine and Colorado ratifications in State Legislatures
magazine that Wyoming State Representative Mark N. Sorenson reported his state's action on the amendment. 20 ' Meanwhile, as Watson's
crusade gathered momentum, conservative and liberal activists of national reputation made short-lived attempts to jump on the
bandwagon. 20 8
202. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
203. The core of Watson's campaign was his updated paper. See Gregory D. Watson,
Can An Amendment To The United States Constitution Proposed by Congress in 1789,
Which Has Never Been Ratified, Still Be Ratified-Even After All These Years? (Mar.
1982, updated Nov. 1985) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Fordham Law Review).
204. See Miller & Dewey, supra note 5, at 101 n.44 (citing 111th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.,
1983 Me. Laws 2727 (April 27, 1983)).
205. See id. at 102 n.46 (citing H.R. Con. Res. 1008, 54th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 1984
Colo. Sess. Laws 1151 (April 18, 1984)).
206. Wyo. H.R.J. Res. 6 (March 3, 1978), reprintedin 138 Cong. Rec. 56836 (daily ed.
May 19, 1992) (documents supplementing remarks of Senator Robert C. Byrd). Miller
and Dewey report that the governor of Wyoming signed the resolution on March 6 even
though the Constitution does not require him to do so. See Miller & Dewey, supra note
5, at 100.
207. See Miller & Dewey, supra note 5, at 100 n.36 (citing Mark N. Sorenson, Wyoming ratified amendment in 1978, 10 State Legislatures No. 9, at 4 (Oct. 1984)).

208. In 1987, Paul Gann, co-author (with Howard Jarvis) of California's Proposition
13 (an influential limit on state property taxes), founded a movement to submit the com-
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As grounds for reviving a nearly two-hundred-year-old proposal, Watson and his allies cited the public's general and growing anger with the
mechanisms by which Congress has sought to raise its salaries without
going on record . 2 ° They also invoked the authority of the original authors and supporters of the amendment, particularly James Madison, arguing that history had borne out their concerns. For example, the
Colorado legislature declared as part of its 1984 resolution of ratification:
Whereas, The General Assembly of the State of Colorado finds that
the proposed amendment is still meaningful and needed as part of the
United States Constitution and that the present political, social, and
economic conditions are the same or even more demanding today than
they were when the proposed amendment was submitted for its adoption ....

21

Most scholars had dismissed the 1789 compensation amendment as a
trivial backwater of constitutional law. For example, Professor Walter
Dellinger of Duke University Law School commented in 1989:
I think it's clearly dead.... It was proposed without any time deadline ....

There's no rule in the Constitution saying an amendment

proposed by Congress expires if not ratified by a certain time. But the
Supreme Court has held that the adoption of an amendment is to reflect a "contemporary consensus."2 11Therefore, an amendment dormant
for 200 years is no longer viable.
And yet the parade of state ratifications continued:
1984:
1
1985:
5
1986:
3
1987:
4
1988:
3
1989:

7

1990:
1991:

2
1

1992:

6212

pensation amendment anew to more states' legislatures, and consumer activist Ralph Nader also urged its adoption. And, in the early months of 1992, freshman Republican
members of the House led by John Boehner (Republican-Ohio) took up the amendment
as one of their chief projects. None of these efforts made a significant contribution to the
eventual success of the Twenty-seventh Amendment. Telephone Interview with Gregory
D. Watson, supra note 191.
209. See Watson, supra note 203, at 3-11, 27. On that anger, see Americans to Limit
Congressional Terms, Inc., Kick the Bums Outl The Case for Term Limitations 16, 42
(1992) [hereinafter Kick the Bums Out]; Alan Ehrenhalt, The United States of Ambition:
Politicians, Power, and the Pursuit of Office 15-16 (1992); George F. Will, Restoration:
Congress, Term Limits and the Recovery of Deliberative Democracy 199-200 (1992).
210. Slumbering Proposal, supra note 5, at 17 (quoting Journal of the Senate, State of
Colorado, 54th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., at 966 (1984)).
211. Don Phillips, ProposedAmendment, Age 200, Showing Life, Wash. Post, March

29, 1989, at A23.
212. See infra note 214.
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The ratification of the compensation amendment spawned several constitutional oddities of its own. For example, in only one state (for the only
time in the history of the amending process) did the people have the
chance to decide the amendment's fate themselves. In 1978, Idaho's legislature had adopted a resolution requiring that any proposed amendment to the Constitution be approved by a statewide referendum before

the legislature could ratify it. In 1986, the state's attorney general issued
an opinion declaring that the 1978 requirement was a violation of Article

V, but in 1988 the state legislature directed the holding of a referendum
on the compensation amendment. Once it was overwhelmingly approved
by the voters, on November 8, 1988, the Idaho legislature ratified it.213
On May 7, 1992, the legislatures of Michigan and New Jersey raced to
supply the needed thirty-eighth ratification. Michigan acted first; New
Jersey's legislators, disappointed that they missed the honor of putting
the amendment into the Constitution, nonetheless ratified the amendment as the thirty-ninth state, overturning their predecessors' decision in
1789 to reject it. Five days later, Illinois also ratified, bringing the total
number of states approving the amendment to forty. Five weeks later,
California boosted the total to forty-one.2 14
Members of Congress and constitutional scholars reacted with confusion to the news of the 1789 amendment's apparent success. For example, Professor Dellinger declared, "'My own view is that Congress has
no formal role to play.... The amendment process is completed by act of
the last necessary state.' "25 Some made a quick check to see if there
were any other "unexploded time bombs" lurking in the amending process; 216 others continued to insist that the amendment had become a
213. Telephone Interview with Gregory D. Watson, supra note 191.
214. According to Watson, the following states have ratified the amendment: Maryland (December 19, 1789); North Carolina (December 22, 1789 & July 4, 1989); South
Carolina (January 19, 1790); Delaware (January 28, 1790); Vermont (November 3, 1791);
Virginia (December 15, 1791); Ohio (May 6, 1873); Wyoming (March 3, 1978); Maine
(April 27, 1983); Colorado (April 18, 1984); South Dakota (February 21, 1985); New
Hampshire (March 7, 1985); Arizona (April 3, 1985); Tennessee (May 23, 1985);
Oklahoma (July 10, 1985); New Mexico (February 13, 1986); Indiana (February 19,
1986); Utah (February 25, 1986); Arkansas (March 5, 1987); Montana (March 11, 1987);
Connecticut (May 13, 1987); Wisconsin (June 30, 1987); Georgia (February 2, 1988);
West Virginia (March 10, 1988); Louisiana (July 6, 1988); Iowa (February 7, 1989);
Idaho (March 23, 1989); Nevada (April 26, 1989); Alaska (May 5, 1989); Oregon (May
19, 1989); Minnesota (May 22, 1989); Texas (May 25, 1989); Kansas (April 5, 1990);
Florida (May 31, 1990); North Dakota (March 25, 1991); Missouri (May 5, 1992); Alabama (May 5, 1992); Michigan (May 7, 1992); New Jersey (May 7, 1992); Illinois (May
12, 1992); California (June 26, 1992). Telephone Interviews with Gregory D. Watson
(June 24, 1992 & September 24, 1992). Watson notes several inaccuracies in the list
prepared by the Archivist. See Letter from Don W. Wilson, Archivist of the United
States, to the Senate and House of Representatives (May 17, 1992), reprinted in 138
Cong. Rec. S6828 (daily ed. May 19, 1992).
215. Bill McAllister, Across Two Centuries, a Founder Updates the Constitution, Wash.
Post, May 14, 1992, at Al, A5 (quoting Professor Walter Dellinger).
216. The "unexploded time bombs" are the following: the 1789 reapportionment
amendment, which in 1992 would produce a House of Representatives of more than
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dead letter some time between September 26, 1789, when Congress proposed it to the states, and May 7, 1992.217
Attention focused on the Archivist of the United States, who since
21 8
1984 has had the statutory responsibility for certifying amendments.
The task of certifying an amendment extends only to determining
whether the state certificates of ratification meet the requirements of Article V and whether the certificates set forth congruent texts of the
amendment. Declaring these requirements met, Archivist Don W. Wilson ruled the Twenty-seventh Amendment ratified, on May 18, 1992. A
day later, it was published in the FederalRegister, the official repository
of statutes, regulations, and constitutional amendments.21 9 Wilson's certification persuaded most constitutional scholars to accept the
amendment.
Stunned by the adoption of the amendment, the leadership of the
House and the Senate seesawed back and forth. Speaker of the House
Thomas S. Foley (Democrat-Washington), who at first was dubious
about the validity of the amendment, then declared that, if the Archivist
was willing to certify it, he would accept its adoption. At the same time,
however, he publicly toyed with the possibility of holding hearings on the
amending process-which in the end never took place.
The Senate's President pro tempore, Robert C. Byrd (Democrat-West
Virginia), maintained that Congress retained its prerogative to determine
whether and when an amendment is validly ratified. Senator Charles
Grassley (Republican-Iowa) agreed, insisting that "there is a reason that
the Senate needs to act ...to ward off any legal attacks that might come
on the issue of timeliness."2 20 Byrd and Grassley reproved the Archivist
for not following the former custom of sending notification to the House
5,000 members, Ames, supra note 180, at 42-45; an 1810 proposal stripping American
citizenship from any citizen who accepts a title of nobility from any foreign prince or
potentate, see id. at 186-89; the 1861 "Corwin amendment," adopted during the tense
months before the outbreak of the Civil War, which would have deprived Congress of any
power to tamper with slavery, see id. at 195-97; and a 1924 proposal authorizing Congress to regulate or prohibit products of child labor in interstate commerce, see Alan P.
Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution 101-04 (1978); see also
infra notes 242-56 and accompanying text.
217. See Paul M. Barrett & David Rogers, A Timely Measure Gains RatificationAfter
Two Centuries, Wall St. J., May 8, 1992, at A10 (reaction of Prof. Walter Dellinger);
Richard L. Berke, 1789 Amendment Is Ratified But Now the Debate Begins, N.Y. Times,
May 8, 1992, at Al, A21 (comments of attorney Linda R. Monk); Paul Horwitz, Foley
Seeks LegalAdvice After 39th State Ratifies 27th Amendment, Roll Call, May 11, 1992, at
3, 35 (comments of Norman H. Ornstein, American Enterprise Institute).
218. From 1791 through 1818, the Secretary of State had carried out the duty of certifying amendments as a matter of course; in 1818, Congress enacted a statute officially
assigning the Secretary that responsibility. In 1951, Congress amended the statute to
transfer the responsibility to the Administrator of General Services, who supervised the
publication of the Federal Register. See Act of Oct. 13, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-248, § 2(b),
65 Stat. 710. In 1984, yet another statute transferred both tasks to the Archivist of the
United States. See 1 U.S.C. § 106b (1988).
219. See 57 Fed. Reg. 21,187 (1992).
220. 138 Cong. Rec. S6940 (daily ed. May 20, 1992) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
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and the Senate and allowing Congress a brief time to review the documents related to the amendment in question before certifying it. This
procedure, they maintained, had been followed with previous amendments, particularly the Fourteenth, which had been beset by the problem

of state legislatures' attempts to rescind ratifications. For this reason,
they introduced a resolution seeking to declare invalid, by the expiration
of time, the four unratified amendments. 221
While praising the Twenty-seventh Amendment, Senator William V.

Roth (Republican-Delaware) pointed out that "some questions are left

unanswered."'
Noting the existence of four other unratified amendments lacking time limits, Roth asked that Congress adopt Byrd's resolution declaring these proposals to have lapsed. If Congress could declare
ratified an amendment that most scholars had assumed was a dead letter
for two centuries, Roth demanded, "why cannot the States ratify even
the expired amendments-those which failed ratification before a congressionally imposed deadline-in the hope that Congress would later
extend the deadline?"" 3
Representative William B. Clay (Democrat-Missouri) reminded his
colleagues that since 1989, Congress had followed, by statute, the same

procedure that the 1789 amendment mandated. In Clay's view, the 1989

Ethics Reform Act,2 24 passed in response to the public outcry against the

latest congressional pay raises, seemed to make the Twenty-seventh
Amendment unnecessary.

Clay also asked whether the Amendment

would outlaw for members of Congress the automatic COLAs that federal law provided to every federal employee. 22 -

221. The measure, Senate Concurrent Resolution 121, introduced May 19, 1992, is still
pending in the Senate, as of October 16, 1992. See S. Con. Res. 121, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992). Because its adoption would clarify this unresolved issue without significantly
easing the restrictions of the amending process, the Senate should adopt it.
222. 138 Cong. Rec. S6950 (daily ed. May 20, 1992) (statement of Sen. Roth).
223. Id
224. See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (effective
Jan. 1, 1991).
225. See 138 Cong. Rec. E1456 (daily ed. May 20, 1992) (extended remarks of Rep.
Clay). When asked about the constitutionality of COLAs, Professor Laurence H. Tribe
of Harvard Law School was uncertain, suggesting that he could come up with plausible
arguments either way but doubting whether it would be "politically wise" for any member of Congress to bring the issue to court. See Bill McAllister, Madison's Remedy May
Ignite Hill Pay Dispute, Wash. Post, May 19, 1992, at A17. Gregory Watson has concluded that the amendment would bar annual COLAs but not a statute permitting a
COLA at the beginning of each Congress. Telephone Interview with Gregory D. Watson, supra note 191.
On October 29, 1992, less than six months after the amendment's adoption, a heterogeneous collection of politicians, attorneys, and organizations filed the first lawsuit to invoke the amendment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. See
Boehner v. Anderson, Civ. No. 92-2427 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 29, 1992). The litigation,
spearheaded by the American Constitutional Law Foundation, challenged as unconstitutional the 1989 Ethics Reform Act's system of annual COLAs for Senators and Representatives. Twenty congressional incumbents (eighteen Representatives and two
Senators) and more than 100 challengers for congressional seats have joined the lawsuit.
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Whatever the merit of these issues, political realities dictated the
speedy endorsement of the Twenty-seventh Amendment. On May 20,
1992, Congress confirmed the Archivist's decision by overwhelming margins in both houses. The Senate vote was 99_0;226 the House approved
the amendment (after brief discussion) by a 227
vote of 414-3, with eighteen
Representatives either absent or not voting.
The three Representatives voting "No" were Neal Smith (DemocratIowa), Carl C. (Chris) Perkins (Democrat-Kentucky), and Craig Washington (Democrat-Texas). Smith explained that, while he had no problem with the substance of the new. amendment, "it's short-term political
pandering without regard to long-term consequences to the Constitution. ' 221 Washington inexplicably cast his ballot against the amendment
despite having voted for ratification as a Texas state senator in 1989.229
Though some journalists have characterized the campaign to resurrect
the compensation amendment as a right-wing attack on Congress, Gregory Watson has rejected the charge:
That's pure nonsense. The state legislators who voted to ratify the
amendment formed bipartisan coalitions, from both political parties,
and those few who opposed the amendment also came from both parties. It transcended party; it transcended 'liberal versus conservative.'
It was truly bipartisan.2 s °

He declared that the adoption of the 1789 amendment "is the greatest
thing in my thirty-year life."2'31
V.

CONSEQUENCES

The procedures outlined in Article V pose a host of unresolved difficulties. For example: Does a proposed amendment have a "shelf life"See Lawmakers and CandidatesSue to Block CongressionalPay Raise, N.Y. Times (nat'l
ed.), Oct. 30, 1992, at A14. Ironically, this lawsuit seems to confirm the fears of Repre-

sentative Theodore Sedgwick (Federalist-Massachusetts), who in 1789 warned that a
compensation amendment might enable candidates to politicize the salary issue as a way
to gain or retain office, and to defeat the hopes of the amendment's advocates to prevent
manipulation of issues of congressional compensation for short-term political advantage.
See supra text accompanying note 154. John C. Armor, the attorney who filed the suit,
conceded that some of the plaintiffs might be politically motivated, but "other plaintiffs,
like the American Legislative Exchange Council, have been pushing this for years. They
don't stand to gain or lose anything by this-they just think that it's right and makes
sense." Telephone Interview with John C. Armor, Esq. (Nov. 2, 1992).
226. See Richard L. Berke, Congress Backs 27th Amendment, N.Y. Times, May 21,

1992, at A26. Only Lloyd Bentsen (Democrat-Texas) missed the vote due to illness.
Telephone Interview with Gregory D. Watson, supra note 191.
227. See S. Con. Res. 120, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced May 19, 1992 and passed
May 20, 1992); Berke, supra note 226.
228. H. Con. Res. 320, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced May 19, 1992 and passed
May 20, 1992); J. Jennings Moss, House, Senate OK amendment, Wash. Times, May 21,
1992, at A3.
229. Telephone Interview with Gregory D. Watson, supra note 191.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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that is, a period after which it may be deemed to have expired? This
issue is posed most starkly by the 202 years of the Twenty-seventh
Amendment's birth pangs. May a state rescind its ratification of an
amendment? May Congress
establish a time limit on a proposed amend232
ment's ratification?
Such "ordinary" issues of the amending process have erupted in disputes over the framing and adoption of specific amendments. These issues fall into two categories: (i) the status of proposed amendments, and
(ii) the states' actions in ratifying or rejecting amendments. Some of
these issues have been affected, and perhaps partly resolved, by the adoption of the Twenty-seventh Amendment.
Only two decisions of the Supreme Court have dealt with such issues:
Dillon v. Gloss, 233 concerning issues raised by the Eighteenth Amendment, and Coleman v. Miller,234 which superseded Dillon and established
the modem doctrinal framework for deciding issues arising under Article
V.
Dillon v. Gloss addressed the validity of time limits imposed by Congress on proposed amendments. When Congress proposed the Eighteenth Amendment (authorizing Prohibition), it imposed a time limit of
seven years within which the amendment had to be ratified. If the time
limit passed without the amendment receiving a sufficient number of ratifications, it expired. All but one of the amendments following the Eighteenth have incorporated a time limit, either in the text or in the
authorizing resolution adopted by Congress. 2" In Dillon, Justice Willis
Van Devanter held that Congress could impose a reasonable time limit
on the Eighteenth Amendment, and that the seven-year limit chosen was
reasonable:
We do not find anything in [Article V] which suggests that an
amendment once proposed is to be open to ratification for all time, or
that ratification in some of the States may be separated from that in
others by many years and yet be effective. We do find that which
232. Issues growing out of the convention procedure authorized by Article V-a procedure that has never been used-are beyond the scope of this Article, but they overshadow most attempts to use the amending process. For example: What, if any,
standards govern the convention procedure? May Congress set conditions for determining when the constitutional prerequisites for calling a convention have been met? Do the
terms of the Constitution control the organization and administration of a convention?
May Congress impose enforceable limits or mandates on a convention? Is there any recourse if such a convention casts aside its mandate and limitations? May the convention
set aside the requirements of Article V? See infra note 259. Further discussion may be
found in Bernstein with Agel, supra note *, at chapters 13-14, and in Thomas M. Durbin,
Congressional Research Serv. No. 92-729A, Amending the U.S. Constitution: by Congress or by Constitutional Convention (Sept. 18, 1992).
233. 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
234. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
235. The Child Labor Amendment, proposed in 1924, did not contain a time limit
because the House and the Senate could not agree on how long that limit should be. See
Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of ConstitutionalChange: Rethinking the Amendment
Process, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 386 (1983).
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236

First, Van Devanter declared, proposal and ratification are succeeding
steps in a single process, "the natural inference being that they are not to
be widely separated in time."2' 37 Second, amendments are proposed
when they are deemed necessary, and necessity implies that ratification
should be accomplished with speed. 238 Third, because ratification is the
approval of an amendment by the people in three-fourths of the states, it
ought to be "sufficiently contemporaneous ... to reflect the will of the
people in all sections at relatively the same period."2'39
In pursuing his reasoning, Van Devanter commented on the unratified
amendments in words pregnant with irony seven decades later:
[F]our amendments proposed long ago- two in 1789, one in 1810 and
one in 1861-are still pending and in a situation where their ratification in some of the States many years since by representatives of generations now largely forgotten may be effectively supplemented in
enough more States to make three-fourths by representatives of the
present or some future generation. To that view few
would be able to
24
subscribe, and in our opinion it is quite untenable. 0
Time limits again became an issue when, in 1979, Congress adopted a
three-year extension of the time limit for the Equal Rights Amendment-a limit specified in the authorizing resolution but not in the
amendment's text. Some charged that Congress had illegally changed
the rules in the middle of the process. Defenders of the extension maintained that Congress only lacked the power to adjust time limits incorporated in the text of proposed amendments. Although a federal district
court in Idaho ruled that Congress had erred in extending the time limit,
the case did not reach the Supreme Court until after the amendment's
extended deadline24had
elapsed, and the Justices vacated the lower court's
1
moot.
as
decision
Coleman v. Miller, decided in 1939, established the principle that issues having to do with the ratification of amendments are political questions best left to the determination of Congress. At issue in Coleman was
the ratification of the Child Labor Amendment by the Kansas legislature,
which in 1925 had rejected the amendment but reconsidered it in 1937,
thirteen years after Congress had sent it to the states.2 42 Although the
Kansas House of Representatives voted to ratify, the state senate divided
equally, twenty to twenty.2 43 The lieutenant governor, who presided
236. Dillon, 256 U.S. at 374.
237. Id. at 374-75.
238. See id. at 375.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981), vacated as moot sub
nom. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
242. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435 (1939).
243. See id. at 436.
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over the senate, cast the tie-breaking vote in favor of ratification. 2 "
Twenty-one state senators and three state representatives then sued for
an order directing the Kansas secretary of state not to authenticate the
resolution. 24 5 They cited three grounds: (1) as an executive officer, the
lieutenant governor should have no role in the ratification process; (2)
the 1925 vote to reject the amendment ended Kansas's discussion of ratification, and could not be set aside by a later legislative vote; and (3) the
amendment had lapsed, not having been ratified within a reasonable
247
time. 2' The state supreme court rejected all three arguments.
The United States Supreme Court heard the legislators' appeal, and
held (5-4) that the legislators had standing to bring the suit. 248 But the
Court did not resolve the issue of the lieutenant governor's authority to
break a legislative tie vote on a proposed amendment. Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes reported that the Court was equally divided and
therefore "expresse[d] no opinion upon that point."2 49
Lumping together the issue of the effect of the 1925 vote to reject and
that of timeliness, Chief Justice Hughes, joined by Justices Harlan Fiske
Stone and Stanley Reed, disposed of each in turn. Citing the precedents
established in 1868 by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment-in
which the Secretary of State referred the question of rescinded ratifications to Congress, which in turn ignored the rescissions and declared the
amendment ratified-Hughes wrote the following cloudy paragraph that
has dominated congressional views on the amending process for over half
a century:
We think that in accordance with this historic precedent the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in the light of
previous rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as a
political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the
promulgation of the adoption of the amendment. 5 °
Turning to the timeliness issue, Hughes acknowledged that Dillon had
accepted the power of Congress to set a time limit on a proposed amendment-but rejected the petitioners' contention "that, in the absence of a
limitation by the Congress, the Court can and should decide what is a
reasonable period within which ratification may be had."' I Pointing out
that there was no source from which criteria of timeliness could be derived, Hughes declared that the congressional power to set a time limit
244. See id.
245. See id.

246. See icl; Dellinger, supra note 235, at 390-91.
247. See Coleman v. Miller, 71 P.2d 518 (Kan. 1937).
248. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Roberts, Black, and Douglas, filed a separate opinion rejecting the legislators' claim to have standing to bring the suit. See Cole-

man, 307 U.S. at 460-70.

249. Id at 447.
250. Id at 450.
251. Id at 452.
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was part of a broader congressional prerogative to determine whether a
time limit was necessary and appropriate.2 5 2
Justices Hugo L. Black, Owen J. Roberts, Felix Frankfurter, and William 0. Douglas reached the same conclusion as did Chief Justice
Hughes, but by a slightly different route. They recognized an even wider
scope for congressional discretion:
The [amending] process itself is "political" in its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not
subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point....
Congress, possessing exclusive power over the amending process, cannot be bound by and is under no duty to accept the pronouncements
upon that exclusive power by this Court or by the Kansas courts.25 3
Justices Pierce Butler and James C. McReynolds dissented, arguing in
vain that the amendment had become a dead letter because "more than a
reasonable time had elapsed." 25' 4 Noting that in Dillon the Court had
found that the seven-year time limit set by Congress was reasonable, Justices Butler and McReynolds charged that the majority had brushed
aside the holding and reasoning of the earlier case. The dissenters concluded that the Child Labor Amendment had lapsed.2 5 5
Congress has relied ever since on Coleman as authority for its exclusive prerogative to decide whether to recognize proposed amendments as
validly ratified. For example, in the May 1992 Senate debate on the
Twenty-seventh Amendment, Senator Byrd invoked Coleman, a position
with which Gregory Watson agreed. Watson stated, "Had Congress rejected the amendment, it would have been within their powers to do so
under the doctrines of Coleman v. Miller. That's why, in many of the
state resolutions of ratification, I made sure that Coleman v. Miller was
cited and recognized." 2' 56
As Watson rightly perceived, Coleman has established the context
within which issues of the amending process, including the following, are
played out:
Contemporaneity: We can keep a bottle of milk in our refrigerator
indefinitely, but at some point it will spoil and become undrinkable. By
analogy, even in cases where Congress has not set a specific time limit on
a proposed amendment, and despite the holding of Coleman, many schol252. See id. at 453-56.
253. Id. at 459 (Black, Roberts, Frankfurter, and Douglas, JJ., concurring).
254. Id. at 470-74 (Butler and McReynolds, JJ., dissenting).

255. See id.
256. Telephone Interview with Gregory D. Watson, supra note 191. The more than
fifty years that have passed since Coleman v. Miller was decided have witnessed dramatic
constrictions of the "political questions" doctrine in constitutional law. See Laurence H.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 96-107 (2d ed. 1988) (on political questions). But
the doctrine retains its vitality when applied to issues of the amending process, see id. at
64-65 n.9, 101-02, though several scholars maintain the legitimacy, necessity, and advisability of an active judicial role in supervising the workings of the process. See id. at 10102; Dellinger, supra note 235; infra note 262.
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ars maintain that there must be some point in the life of the proposal
'
when it is no longer "live."257
In 1873, as we have seen, Ohio ratified an
amendment proposed in 1789, leading Congress to impose a time limit on
most subsequent proposed amendments. 25 8 But is an amendment lacking
a time limit still valid? Or does Congress simply make assurance "double
sure" by including time limits in proposed amendments even though they
may not be needed?
At first glance, the Archivist's certification on May 18, 1992, and Congress's action on May 20, 1992, would seem to foreclose their respective
authorities to reject any future amendment based merely on issues of
contemporaneity. As noted above, however, Senators Byrd and Grassley
have introduced a resolution by which Congress would invalidate the
four other unratified and possibly "live" amendments-but Congress has
not yet acted on this resolution. 25 9
* Rescission: May a state rescind its decision to ratify a constitutional amendment? Or may a state that has rejected an amendment re257. See Laura Michaelis, The Constitution: Both Chambers Rush to Accept 27th
Amendment on Salaries, 50 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 1423 (May 23, 1992) (comments of
Professor Walter E. Dellinger); Richard L. Berke, More Amendments Lurk in the Mists
of History, N.Y. Times, May 24, 1992, § 4, at 2 (comments of Professor Paul Gewirtz of
Yale Law School).
258. See Ames, supra note 180, at 291-92, 292 n.l.
259. The convention procedure of Article V requires the submission of applications
from two-thirds of the states to compel Congress to call a constitutional convention. As
of October, 1989, 32 states-two short of the requirement-have filed applications, beginning with North Dakota in 1975. See Russell L. Caplan, Constitutional Brinksmanship:
Amending the Constitution by National Convention 78-89 (1988); Durbin, supra note
232; David C. Huckabee, Congressional Research Serv. No. IB80062, Constitutional
Conventions: Political and Legal Questions (October 18, 1989); infra text accompanying
notes 283-84.
Historically, Congress has used two standards to evaluate-and to fend off-secondconvention movements. First, the applications must agree in subject-matter (that is, the
purpose of the convention). See Caplan, supra, at 105-08. Second, the applications must
be timely or contemporaneous. See id.at 110-14.
Assuming only for the present discussion that there is no requirement of subject-matter
consistency, what effect might the adoption of the Twenty-seventh Amendment have on
the convention procedure? Has the success of that amendment disposed of the contemporaneousness requirement? Theoretically, advocates of a second convention could aggregate the thirty-two state resolutions from the period 1975-1988 with some or all of the
thirty-two resolutions received in the 1960s to support a convention to overturn the
Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions, see id.at 73-78; or some of the dozens of
applications calling for other constitutional reforms, see id at 65-73, or, in the years
between 1893 and 1913, those demanding direct election of Senators, see id. at 61-65, or
even the two 1789 applications by Virginia and New York? See id. at 36-38.
It can still be maintained, nonetheless, that contemporaneousness is a valid requirement governing the convention procedure. First, as suggested by the resolution offered
by Senators Byrd and Grassley, supra note 221 and accompanying text, the Twentyseventh Amendment succeeded because Congress applied a contextually sensitive rule of
contemporaneousness, noting the lack of specific historical changes in the nation or its
politics undercutting the amendment's continuing relevance. Second, the requirements
surrounding invocation of the constituent power-the extraordinary power residing in
the People of the United States to constitute or reconstitute their form of governmentplausibly require that the applications be close together in time. Their contemporaneous-
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verse itself and ratify the amendment? These issues are most famous in
connection with the Equal Rights Amendment, but they first arose in
connection with the Civil War Amendments. The ratifications of the
Twenty-seventh Amendment by New Jersey (1992, after rejecting it in
1789) and New Hampshire (1985, after rejecting it in 1790) revive rescission issues yet again.
Although most courts seek to avert such questions by citing the "political question" doctrine, the prevailing view is that the amending process
works in only one direction. Once a state rejects an amendment, it is free
to reconsider and ratify it; however, once a state ratifies an amendment,
it may not rescind that ratification. A state's decision to adopt an
amendment forms the basis for later states' decisions whether to adopt or
to reject. To permit the rescission of a ratification would be to confuse
and perhaps derail the amending process's orderly functioning. 2" By
contrast, if a state reconsiders its rejection of an amendment, its action
does not undercut the basis for later states' decisions. A state should be
free to change its mind about rejecting an amendment if other states'
actions demonstrate that the amendment has general popular support.
The Archivist's and Congress's acceptance of the Twenty-seventh
Amendment-recognizing by implication that the New Jersey (1992)
and New Hampshire (1985) ratifications were valid despite the states'
previous decisions to reject the amendment-provide added support for
this position.2"6 '
0 Constitutionality: May Congress or the courts reject a constitutional amendment, otherwise validly ratified, as unconstitutional? The
conventional and common-sense answer to this question is "No. Before
an amendment is ratified, it is just a proposal-nothing more and nothing
less. If it is ratified, then it is part of the Constitution, and becomes constitutional by definition."
This common-sense approach has been challenged by several legal
ness would manifest a general consensus that only a convention is both adequate to respond to the perceived problem and competent to generate the necessary rcmedy.
I plan to explore the convention procedure in a future Article. See also Bernstein with
Agel, supra note *, at chs. 13-14 (same). Caplan, supra, is the most scholarly and
thoughtful analysis of the convention clause, but it manifests a bias toward clearing away
real or perceived obstacles to the calling of a limited constitutional convention. Also, see
generally Symposium on the Article V Convention Process, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 837 (1968)
(discussing Senator Everett Dirksen's call for a second convention to overturn the reapportionment decisions and Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.'s proposed legislation to authorize
and structure a second convention).
260. Samuel S. Freedman & Pamela J. Naughton, ERA: May a State Change Its
Vote? (1978), is the most detailed and thoughtful analysis. Professor Dellinger argues
that, even though history and the constitutional text provide no dispositive answer, substantive questions of public policy and constitutional legitimacy give great weight to the
position that a ratification may not be rescinded. See Dellinger, supra note 235, at 42127.
261. See, e.g., Dellinger, supra note 235, at 420-21 (calling for the Supreme Court to
recognize, on the merits of an appropriate case, a state's right to reconsider a vote to
reject).
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scholars, who have suggested that certain amendments could be so
threatening to the fabric of the constitutional system that they might well
be deemed unconstitutional.2 6 2 They note that in other nations, such as
India, it is possible to invalidate a constitutional amendment if it would
'263
subvert the constitution's "basic structure.
Article V sets forth only one limitation on the types of amendments
that may be proposed: "that no State, without its Consent shall be deprived of it's [sic] equal Suffrage in the Senate. '" 26 Questions about constitutional limitations on Article V arose for the first time in reaction to
the Civil War Amendments of 1865-1870. Opponents of the Thirteenth
Amendment, which abolished slavery, and the Fifteenth Amendment,
which outlawed racial discrimination in access to the franchise, asserted
that these Amendments radically expanded the power of the general government beyond the confines set by the framers in 1787-1788, and thus
exceeded the boundaries given to the amending process.2 65 These arguments failed, but opponents of proposed amendments excluding issues of
school prayer and reapportionment from the jurisdiction of the federal
courts have tried to make a similar case.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical amendment that establishes the
Judaeo-Christian tradition as the nation's official set of religious values.
Such an amendment, being directly contrary to the commands of the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and
the extraordinary religious diversity of American life,2 66 might be unconstitutional. Or suppose Congress decided to adopt the amendment, proposed in 1985 by a lawyer practicing in California, repealing the Civil
War Amendments and limiting citizenship to white people of European
descent.26 7 Would this proposed amendment do such violence to the system of constitutional governance, and the long-established network of
individual rights, that it should be deemed unconstitutional and unadoptable, even in the face of popular demand for it?
A major stumbling block for this line of reasoning is that under these
262. Compare Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a
Restrained JudicialRole, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 433-45 (1983) (discussing and rejecting
the concept of judicial review of amendments' substance), with Walter Dellinger, Constitutional Politics A Rejoinder, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 446, 446-50 (1983) (defending judicial
review) and Walter F. Murphy, An Orderingof ConstitutionalValues, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev.
703, 755-56 (1980) (urging judicial invalidation of an amendment contrary to the preeminent constitutional value of human dignity).
263. See Laurence H. Tribe, The 27th Amendment Joins the Constitution, Vall St. J.,
May 13, 1992, at A15.
264. U.S. Const. art. V.
265. See Grimes, supra note 216, at 37 (remarks of Senator Garret Davis); Walter F.
Murphy, Slaughter-House, Civil Rights, and the Limits on ConstitutionalChange, 1987
Am. J. Juris. 1.

266. See Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the
Passage of the First Amendment (1986). Contra Robert L. Cord, Separation of Church

and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction (1982).

267. James 0. Pace, Amendment to the Constitution: Averting the Decline and Fall
of America (1985).
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criteria, the Thirteenth Amendment could be deemed unconstitutional,
for it was an extraordinary reversal of constitutional doctrines having to
do with the institution of slavery and the question of racial equality. Arguments against the constitutionality of proposed amendments revive the
arguments by border-state Senators and Representatives in 1865 describing the abolition amendment as unconstitutional because it exceeded the
permissible scope of the amending power recognized by Article V and
struck at central components of the compromises underlying the original
Constitution.
Can these "ordinary issues" of the amending process be resolved,
whether by Congress or by the federal courts? One obstacle is the principle underlying the "political question" doctrine: because the people can
and should govern themselves, the institutions of a representative democracy entrusted with the operation of the amending process ought to assume the responsibility of dealing with such questions, rather than
handing the issues off to an unelected judiciary. Another obstacle is
practical: the courts do not wish to inject themselves into disputes between political institutions, or between the people and their elected officials. Whatever the reason, these questions are unlikely to be resolved in
the foreseeable future.
Citing such problems as these, Gregory Watson favors amending Article V. After enduring a weary, decade-long struggle to get the compensation amendment adopted by the states, he concludes, "It's a terrible
process. It's sloppy, extremely unprofessional, and terribly haphazard."2'6 8 Recalling his unexpected discovery of Wyoming's ratification of
the amendment more than six years after the event, he asked, "Is it possible that there are state ratifications that nobody knows about? I think it
is. This amendment may have been ratified a long time ago, and nobody
knew it. There still may be ratifications floating around out there that
nobody knows about."2' 69
Watson's proposed amendment to Article V would require that any
amendment be proposed "by a two-thirds vote of the entire membership
of the House and of the entire membership of the Senate," eliminating the
present practice of using two-thirds of those present and voting. Once
proposed, the amendment would be put before a national popular referendum, to take place on Election Day in the next even-numbered year, to
coincide with Presidential elections or midterm Congressional elections.
An amendment would be declared adopted if it amassed "an absolute
majority-at least 51%-in two-thirds of the House districts through the
entire nation., 270 Watson maintains that this revision would preserve
the requirement of a contemporaneous national consensus in support of a
268. Telephone Interview with Gregory D. Watson, supra note 191.
269. Id.
270. Id. Watson's new standard for congressional action would set aside the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in the NationalProhibitionCases, 253 U.S. 350, 386
(1920). See Durbin, supra note 232, at 2 & n.7.
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successful amendment, and it would bring order, professionalism, and
certainty to "a terrible process.""27 Pointing out that forty-nine of the
fifty states submit state constitutional amendments to a popular vote
(Delaware being the only exception), Watson concludes: "I would take
state legislatures out of the amending process. They shut out the majority of the American people. Amending the Constitution should be a matter between the federal government and the American people." 2 z
CONCLUSION: AMENDMENT POLITICS

In H.G. Wells's classic science-fiction novel, When the Sleeper
Wakes,273 an ordinary Englishman awakens from centuries in suspended
animation to discover that he has become a messiah-like figure in a
stratified future society, the focus of blind devotion by the lower classes. Resisting the blandishments of the ruling elite, he lends his support to a
working-class revolution, only to die (as does the society he is fighting) in
the cataclysmic war he has helped unleash upon the world. The compensation amendment has long been the "Sleeper" of American constitutional history, but the effects its "awakening"-that is, ratification-will
have are far from certain, though they probably will not be so catastrophic as those of its fictional human counterpart. Specifically, the
Amendment's success poses a host of uncomfortable questions for practitioners of "amendment politics," an increasingly popular theme of modem constitutional government.
A. Defining Amendment Politics
The last successful constitutional amendment to be proposed was the
Twenty-sixth Amendment, protecting the right of Americans eighteen
years of age or older to vote.274 Since then, Congress has proposed two
other amendments-the Equal Rights Amendment2 75 and the D.C.
Statehood Amendment 2 7 6 -only to see both go down in flames.
The three proposed amendments that succeeded in clearing the congressional hurdle represent less than one-tenth of one percent of the
271. Id.
272. Id For a brief discussion of proposals to amend Article V, see Peter Suber, The
Paradox of Self-Amendment: A Study of Logic, Law, Omnipotence, and Change app. 1,
at 321-31 (1990).
273. H.G. Wells, When the Sleeper Wakes (1899).
274. U.S. Const. amend. XXVI. Proposed on March 23, 1971, the Twenty-sixth
Amendment was ratified on July 1, declared to be in effect on July 5, and published in the
FederalRegister on July 7. See 36 Fed. Reg. 12,725 (1971).
275. Proposed on March 22, 1972 with a deadline of seven years (extended in 1978 by
three years), the ERA failed on March 30, 1982. See Richard H. Davis, Congressional
Research Serv. No. 85-36 GOV, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States of America Introduced in Congress from the 91st Congress, Ist Session, Through
the 98th Congress, 2nd Session, January 1969-December 1984, at 223, 263-64 (Feb. 1,
1985).
276. Proposed on August 22, 1978 with a seven-year time limit, the D.C. Statehood
Amendment failed on August 22, 1985. See id at 265-66.
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3,491 introduced in Congress between January 1969 and December
1990.277 The extraordinary failure rate of amendments has not deterred
advocates of amendments. Indeed, pressure to add a host of proposed
amendments to the Constitution has increased, not decreased, with each
failure.
Because many scholars fear the minefield of unresolved issues surrounding Article V, they are reluctant to contemplate formal constitutional change, viewing the amending process in general, and specific
proposed amendments, with suspicion and dread.2 7 In part, they are all
too aware of the intimidating practical obstacles posed by the amending
process.
But something more is going on here. Article V induces constitutional
vertigo. Invoking the amending process is as threatening to modem politicians and scholars, and as fraught with risk, as calling up demons
would have been to medieval alchemists. The question is not, "But what
if we fail?" It is, "But what if we succeed?"
For this reason, many observers have found especially alarming the
willingness of right-wing politicians to reach for Article V as if it were a
fire-ax on the wall.2 79 The 1980s let loose a flood of suggested amendments to the Constitution. Would-be framers of various proposed
amendments sought to give the President a line-item veto over appropriations measures; to require a balanced budget; to define human life as beginning at the moment of conception (thereby outlawing abortion as a
matter of federal constitutional law); to authorize Congress and the
states to prohibit the burning of the American flag (thereby overturning
recent Supreme Court decisions); and to impose a limit on the number of
terms that a Representative or Senator can serve in Congress or on the
number of years that a federal judge can hold office.
President Ronald Reagan and other officials of his administration endorsed many of these proposals and encouraged the underlying assumption that these proposals have in common-that the constitutional
system, unable to function to their liking as now organized, requires
overhaul through the amendment process. President George Bush has
been at least as assiduous as his predecessor in championing amendments, including the line-item veto, balanced-budget, flag-burning,
school prayer, and term-limit proposals, and Vice President Dan Quayle
has loyally supported the Bush Administration's constitutional
agenda.2 8 °
277. Daryl B. Harris, Congressional Research Service No. 92-555 GOV, Proposed
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution: 99th-101st Congresses (1985-1990), at 3 (July 9,
1992); Davis, supra note 275, at 268.
278. See Wilbur Edel, A Constitutional Convention: Threat or Challenge? (1981).
279. For a thoughtful and elegant statement of this view, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, On
Amending the Constitution: A Pleafor Patience, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 677 (19891990). Judge Ginsburg is a member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.
280. When he was a Republican Representative from Texas, George Bush proposed

1992]

THE TWENTY-SEVENTH AMENDMENT

Article V's newfound popularity in American politics was fueled by
the remarkable success rate of amendments proposed between 1960 and
1971. Right-wing partisans increasingly came to believe that they, too,
were entitled to make use of Article V after the amendment successes
garnered by the left during those years-namely, the Twenty-third, adding the District of Columbia to the Electoral College for Presidential
elections; the Twenty-fourth, abolishing the poll tax in federal
elections;
8
and the Twenty-sixth, lowering the voting age to eighteen. 1
The "Stop ERA" campaign between 1978 and 1982, which blocked
ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment even after Congress had extended its built-in time limit, reinforced the growing appeal
of amendment politics among right-wing groups. "Stop ERA" gave
right-wing activists a crash course in the workings of Article V. The
hands-on familiarity they thus acquired instilled in them a renewed appreciation of its potential as an instrument to achieve their constitutional
agenda.2 82 The "Stop ERA" campaign helped to catalyze the Reagan
Administration's affinity for demanding constitutional change when the
processes of "normal politics" did not yield the results they and their
ideological allies desired.

In a development paralleling the multiplication of specific proposed
amendments, talk of a second convention-more often to propose a specific amendment than to rewrite the entire document-resurfaced for the
first time in a generation.2 83 By October 1989, thirty-two states-only
two short of the thirty-four required under Article V's convention
method-had adopted calls for a second convention; meanwhile, however, several states had rescinded their applications. 2 Again, President
three amendments: one in 1969 to permit prayer in public buildings, another in 1969 to
establish mandatory retirement ages for members of Congress and federal judges, and a
third in 1970 on equal rights for women. See Davis, supra note 275, at 16, 23, 40 (Bush
proposals).
During his years as a Republican Representative from Indiana, Dan Quayle proposed
five amendments-one in 1977 establishing term limits for President, Vice President,
members of Congress, and federal judges (reintroduced in two different versions in 1979),
one in 1979 to require a balanced budget, and another in 1980 to command a balanced
budget with a three-fifths supermajority needed to raise taxes. See id. at 115, 135, 136,
141, 142 (Quayle proposals).
281. See the excellent discussion in Stephen L. Schechter, Amending the United States
Constitution: A New Generationon Trial, in Redesigning the State: The Politics of Con-

stitutional Change in Industrial Nations 160, 160-202 (Keith G. Banting & Richard Simeon eds., 1985).
282. On the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment, see Mary Frances Berry, Why
ERA Failed: Politics, Women's Rights, and the Amending Process of the Constitution
(1986); Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (1986); and Gilbert Yale Steiner,
Constitutional Inequality: The Political Fortunes of the Equal Rights Amendment
(1985). On the successes of the 1960s and their consequences for later amendment politics, see Schechter, supra note 281.
283. See Caplan, supra note 259, at vii; Huckabee, supra note 259.
284. See the chronology presented in Huckabee, supra note 259, at 9-12. On the relevance of the Twenty-seventh Amendment to Article V convention issues, see supra note
259. On the problem of judicial review of convention issues, see supra note 232.
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Reagan and other government officials embraced calls for a second convention; they argued that the normal processes of government were incapable of responding to the needs of the nation. Thus, "amendment
politics"-the increasing tendency to resort to formal changes in the
Constitution to resolve political problems-has conferred new importance on the amending process.28
But the failure rate of amendment campaigns in the 1980s and 1990s is
becoming increasingly embarrassing. If anything, the success of the
Twenty-seventh Amendment when so many other proposals with so
much distinguished and powerful backing have failed should prompt us
to question just how serious modem amendment campaigns have been.
B.

The Twenty-Seventh Amendment and Amendment Politics

Why should the Twenty-seventh Amendment-a provision proposed
in 1789 and consigned to limbo for over two hundred years-have succeeded when, in the more than twenty years since 1971, all other efforts
to amend the Constitution have failed?
The first reason is its pedigree. Madison's role as its proposer, combined with its place as one of the twelve amendments making up the
original Bill of Rights, gave the Twenty-seventh Amendment an authority and persuasiveness it might not otherwise have had.
The second reason is its plausibility. The Amendment is both credible
and unthreatening. Unlike so many other proposed amendments, which
would produce major alterations in the constitutional system that their
opponents are able to transform into dreadful prospects, 28 6 the change
the Twenty-seventh Amendment effects in the extant constitutional system seems modest, reasonable, and appropriate. Its ratifications in 1873
and in the years since 1978 also suggested its continuing relevance, despite the other dramatic changes that have swept the United States. Finally, the arguments against the amendment focused on arcana of the
amending process and the stratospheric complexities of constitutional
285. This definition is far broader than the conventional view of amendment politics as
the web of political arguments and events surrounding the adoption or rejection of the
specific amendments. See Grimes, supra note 216, at 25-26, 96-97, 121-22, 153-54.
286. For example, a balanced-budget amendment would radically revise the collection
of revenue and the methods of deciding on public spending measures codified in the Constitution, and thus would upset the current balance of powers between the executive and
legislative branches-especially if combined with the proposed line-item veto amendments called for by Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush. A term-limit amendment would alter the role played by seniority in the current Senate and House of
Representatives and might perhaps cut back on the pool of experienced and expert national legislators. The proposed amendments authorizing Congress and the states to
make burning the flag a crime would be the first restricting the coverage of the Bill of
Rights-in particular, the First Amendment. Finally, the various proposed "Human Life
Amendments" would, to varying degrees, preclude whatever judicial protection now exists for the constitutional right to privacy first identified in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), and given its most expansive reading in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
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law; of all those who mounted arguments against the amendment, none
dismissed it on its merits. Unlike the Equal Rights Amendment, which
was doomed by a determined and superbly organized right-wing campaign emphasizing its supposed ghastly consequences, there simply was
no "parade of horribles" (whether real or feigned) that might have resulted from the compensation amendment's adoption.
The third reason for the success of the Twenty-seventh amendment is
its unique history. Having emerged from Congress (albeit in 1789 rather
than closer to the present), the compensation amendment already had
overcome the filter that strains out most proposals to amend the Constitution. Moreover, any analysis of the reasons for the adoption of this
amendment must acknowledge the determination and tactical brilliance
of its "stepfather," Gregory Watson.
In the bleak light cast by the success of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, amendment politics appears to be something different from the
aforementioned definitions.28 7 Rather, the recent history of proposed
amendments suggests the utility of a new understanding of the phrase:
the growing tendency to use the amending process either as an alibi for
not solving major political problems through the ordinary political process or as a means to distract the electorate from more pressing issues.
The prime example of "Article V as alibi" is the campaign by the Reagan and Bush Administrations-and by Senators and Representatives of
both parties-to add a balanced-budget amendment to the Constitution.2"' Some of those who seek such an amendment sincerely believe
that it is the only means to compel the federal government to break its
addiction to deficit spending. As their critics point out, however, using
the amending process, with its inherent delays and supermajority requirements, only postpones the day of reckoning should the amendment
ever become part of the Constitution. Moreover, all the proposals for a
balanced-budget amendment further delay the effective date of the constitutional requirement by several years, further putting off the eventual
budgetary crisis to a time so far in the future that virtually all present
incumbents will have safely retired. Most disturbing of all, invoking the
amending process creates the comforting but illusory impression that the
government is grappling with the problem, rather than sealing it in a
constitutional time vault that only defers the political fallout of a budgetary crisis. 289
287. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
288. See John B. Gilmour, Reconcilable Differences?: Congress, the Budget Process,
and the Deficit (1990); Thomas J. Nicola, Congressional Research Serv. No. 87-445A,
Constitutional Amendments to Balance the Budget and Limit Federal Spending in the
100th Congress: A Table of Features (Apr. 13, 1987); James V. Saturno, Congressional
Research Serv. 89-4GOV, Congress and a Balanced Budget Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution (Jan. 3, 1989); James D. Savage, Balanced Budgets and American Politics
(1988); Joseph White & Aaron Wildavsky, The Deficit and the Public Interest: The
Search for Responsible Budgeting in the 1980s (1989).
289. The House Joint Resolution states in pertinent part:
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The prime example of "Article V as distraction" is the flurry of excitement in 1989 and 1990 over an amendment to protect the American flag
from "desecration," and thus to overturn the Supreme Court's decisions
in Texas v. Johnson2 90 and United States v. Eichman.2 91 Again, many
advocates of a flag protection amendment acted out of a genuine reverence for the flag and an equally forthright belief that the amending pro-

cess was the only way to nullify objectionable Supreme Court decisions.
However, the amending furor provided politicians of both major parties a
distraction that they used to divert the public's attention from the serious
issues confronting the nation.
We may now be approaching yet another instance of "amendment
politics," as some citizens' advocates, political commentators, and high
public officials tout the merits and desirability of amending the Constitution to impose term limits on members of Congress. 292 But is this yet

another case of "Article V as alibi"-with politicians fumbling with the
amending process in order to persuade their constituents that something

useful is being accomplished-or "Article V as distraction"-with politicians drawing the voters' attention away from hard issues by stressing
the need to adopt another amendment?
Politicians may well resort to even these forms of amendment politics
in good faith, seeking to transfer persistent, intractable political quandaries to the seemingly nonpolitical level of constitutional change represented by the amending process. Resorts to amendment politics, under
This article shall take effect beginning with fiscal year 1998, or with the second fiscal year beginning after its ratification, whichever is later.
H.R.J. Res. 290, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1991). On June 11, 1992, this proposed
amendment, introduced on June 26, 1991, by Representative Charles W. Stenholm (Democrat-Texas), failed to win the two-thirds vote needed to emerge from the House; see also
Greg Steinmetz, BalancingAct: Unable to End Deficit Spending, Congress Tries to Push
ConstitutionalAmendment on Itself, N.Y. Newsday, May 24, 1992, at 88 (comments of
James Jones, chairman of American Stock Exchange and former chairman, House
Budget Committee).
290. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
291. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
292. The case for a term-limit amendment is made with most plausibility in Will, supra
note 209; see also Kick the Bums Out, supra note 209 (for a discussion of arguments for
term limits). But see Garry Wills, Undemocratic Vistas, The New York Review of Books,
Nov. 19, 1992, at 28-34 (vigorous critique of George Will's book on historical, constitutional, and intellectual grounds).
President George Bush adopted the cause of a term-limit amendment, citing the perceived disparity between a Presidency limited to two terms, U.S. Const. amend. XXII,
§ 1, and a Congress whose members can serve an indefinite, unlimited number of terms (if
their constituents agree). See, e.g., Transcript of 2d TV Debate Between Bush, Clinton
and Perot, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1992, at All, A12 (Bush endorses term limits in second
1992 presidential debate).
Ironically, President Bush's claimed mentor, former President Ronald Reagan, has endorsed not the campaign for congressional term limits but the repeal of the Twentysecond Amendment. See President Ronald W. Reagan et al., Restoring the Presidency:
Reconsidering the Twenty-second Amendment (1990). For a valuable study refuting the
case for term limits, see Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 Geo. L.J. 477
(1992).
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this view, are natural-perhaps even reasonable-responses to the citizenry's prevailing disdain for politics;29 3 indeed, they are a special case of
the general demand for nonpolitical solutions to these problems that appear to outstrip the capacities of the political system.
Nonetheless, the contrast between the adoption of the Twenty-seventh
Amendment and the consistent failure of all efforts at amendment politics after 1978 should make Americans wary of modem attempts to tout
the amending process as a panacea for national ills. Politicians and other
amendment advocates are all too susceptible to the political temptation
to use the amending process as a means to deflect political heat or to
avoid institutional and personal responsibility for making the hard
choices of American public policy. Yet, as the pace of change in American life continues to accelerate, and as American legal and political ingenuity spurs the raising of new issues under the Constitution for which the
document provides no clear solutions, pressures to amend the Constitution will continue.
293. See E.J. Dionne, Jr., Why Americans Hate Politics (1991); Ehrenhalt, supra note
209; William Greider, Who Will Tell the People? The Betrayal of American Democracy
(1992).

